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LEAD ARTICLE
WHEN FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES MEET
CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES
TANYA J. MONESTIER*
Many contracts that contain a forum selection clause also contain a choice
of law clause. This raises the issue of whether to apply the parties’ chosen law
to questions of forum selection clause interpretation, such as whether the clause
is mandatory or permissive and how far the scope of the clause extends. The
recent trend has been for courts to apply the law selected by the parties in their
choice of law clause to govern these interpretation issues. This Article argues
that the law has gone in the wrong direction and that courts should apply
forum law to questions of forum selection clause interpretation.
This Article challenges each of the stated rationales in favor of applying the
parties’ chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause: the party autonomy
argument; the intention of the parties argument; the certainty and predictability
argument; the substance versus procedure argument; the “part of the contract”
argument; and the forum shopping argument. None of the purported arguments
in favor of applying the parties’ chosen law stand up to closer scrutiny.
Additionally, this Article examines the myriad complications presented by
interpreting a forum selection clause in conjunction with a choice of law clause.
Foremost among these is the sheer complexity of the exercise. Particularly when it
comes to applying foreign country law, there is uncertainty over exactly what the
“chosen law” is. If the parties have selected the law of a European Union country,
for instance, there are a variety of possible laws that could apply: internal domestic
law, the Brussels Regulation, the Hague Choice of Court Convention, or some
combination thereof. Additional complications are presented by structural
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. The author would like
to thank Tyler Martin and Lucas Sylvia for their very helpful research assistance.
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dynamics of the choice of law endeavor: the principle of party prosecution and
the differential treatment of forum selection clauses in a contract without a
choice of law clause. Finally, when one examines what courts are doing in
practice, it is clear that they are not particularly adept at ascertaining and
applying the parties’ chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause. The net
result is a hodge-podge interpretation of mixed U.S. and foreign law.
The choice of law exercise is complicated enough. This Article suggests that
we need not make it any more complicated by using the parties’ chosen law to
interpret a preliminary issue. Ultimately, the responsibility is on the parties to
draft forum selection clauses clearly and without ambiguity. If they do so, then
none of this is an issue.
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INTRODUCTION
Parties to contracts, particularly international contracts, desire
certainty. They want to know ahead of time where they will litigate if a
dispute arises and under what law. Accordingly, contracts often
contain both forum selection and choice of law clauses.1 If a forum
selection clause is carefully drafted, then the inquiry should be fairly
straightforward. For instance, if the parties agree that “the courts of
France shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any and all claims related
to the contract, including, without limitation, any statutory or tort
claims,” there is little interpretative wiggle room. The parties clearly
intended the clause to be mandatory, since they expressly used the
term “exclusive.” And they clearly intended for the clause to be
construed very broadly to cover all claims, including statutory and
tort claims. If a party files suit in New York in contravention of the
clause, the court would likely have little difficulty enforcing the clause
by dismissing the action.
Unfortunately, forum selection clauses are not always a model of
clarity. They are frequently lifted from other contracts without much
thought to their exact wording or scope. This leaves courts with the
unenviable task of trying to figure out “what the parties intended” by
a particular forum selection clause. Did they intend for the clause to
be permissive or mandatory? Did they intend for related tort claims
to be adjudicated in the chosen forum? Did they intend for nonsignatories to be bound by the clause? None of these are easy
1. Symeon C. Symeonides, What Law Governs Forum Selection Clauses, 78 LA. L.
REV. 1119, 1135 (2018) (“Parties who have the foresight to seek jurisdictional
certainty through a [forum selection] clause also tend to be equally concerned with
choice-of-law certainty.”).
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questions. However, over the years, courts have developed a number
of interpretative canons to help guide them in the exercise.2
The issue becomes considerably more complex when choice of law
clauses enter into the mix. A choice of law clause complicates the
inquiry because it raises the specter that the parties’ chosen law
should apply to these interpretative questions. If a U.S. court is called
upon to interpret a forum selection clause in a contract also
containing a choice of law clause, it faces a choice of law decision:
Should it apply forum law to interpret the forum selection clause? Or,
should it apply the parties’ chosen law? Up until fairly recently, it was
common to see courts applying forum law to interpret a forum selection
clause. The reasoning was that issues related to the validity and
enforcement of a forum selection clause were procedural matters to be
governed by the law of the forum, and the interpretation of a forum
selection clause was a necessary prerequisite to its enforcement.3
Lately, though, courts have held that issues of forum selection
clause interpretation should be governed by the law chosen by the
parties in their contract. They advance several arguments in support
of this position. First, choice of law is a manifestation of party
autonomy, and courts should not interfere with that autonomy.
Second, courts should strive to give effect to the intentions of the
parties; by selecting the governing law, the parties intend for a court
to interpret the contract, including the forum selection clause, in
accordance with that law. Third, outcomes will be more certain if
courts apply the parties’ chosen law to interpretative questions
presented by a forum selection clause. Fourth, matters of contractual
interpretation are fundamentally substantive in nature and therefore
should be governed by the chosen law. Fifth, since a forum selection
clause is part of a contract, there is no principled justification for
singling it out and applying a law other than the chosen law. Sixth, by
interpreting a forum selection clause in accordance with the chosen
law, forum shopping is curtailed.
This Article challenges each of these rationales, arguing that they
do not provide a compelling justification for applying the parties’
chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause. This Article also
describes the myriad complications that arise when courts purport to
apply the parties’ chosen law to questions of interpretation,

2. John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1826 (2019).
3. Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1988).
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particularly where the parties have chosen foreign law4 to govern
their dispute. Many years ago, Professor Mullenix observed that:
When confronted with a combined forum-selection and choice-oflaw provision, most courts construe the forum-selection clause
without any reference to the choice-of-law provision . . . . A few
courts, however, have speculated that the presence of a contractual
choice-of-law provision might alter this conventional course of
events. Such idle speculation leads courts into predictable conflictof-laws contortions.5

We are now in the midst of these “predictable conflict-of-laws
contortions.”6 This Article endeavors to move courts away from these
contortions and toward a much simpler analysis.
This Article proceeds as follows: in Part I, I discuss forum selection
clauses and how they are treated by U.S. courts. In Part II, I introduce
the complications presented by a contract containing both a forum
selection clause and a choice of law clause. Next, in Part III, I propose a
four-part framework for approaching the intersection between these two
types of clauses. I then transition in Part IV to my primary argument:
that the rationales advanced in support of applying the parties’ chosen
law to question of forum selection clause interpretation are not
persuasive. In Part V, I provide five separate reasons for why courts
should not use the parties’ chosen law to interpret forum selection
clauses, especially when that law is foreign law. Finally, I offer some
concluding remarks about how much of this can be easily avoided.
I. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN U.S. COURTS
Forum selection clauses7 are ubiquitous in contracts, particularly
international commercial contracts.8 They are seen as a manifestation
of party autonomy and are thought to provide a measure of
4. “Foreign” law is often thought to refer to either the law of another state or
the law of another country. In this Article, I generally use the term in the latter sense.
5. Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 347 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
6. Id.
7. U.S. courts tend to use the term “forum selection clause.” Courts in other
countries typically use the term “jurisdiction clause” or “jurisdiction agreement.” Other
common monikers include “choice of court clause” and “choice of forum clause.”
8. Matthew J. Sorensen, Note, Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal
Court After Atlantic Marine, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2528 (2014) (“Forum-selection
clauses have permeated American commercial activity to such an extent that even many
of today’s form contracts designate the appropriate forum to litigate disputes.”).
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foreseeability and predictability with respect to any potential
litigation. There are two broad types of forum selection clauses:
mandatory and permissive.9 A mandatory forum selection clause
requires that the parties litigate only in their designated forum. That
is, a mandatory clause purports to preclude the parties from initiating
suit in any jurisdiction other than the one chosen in the forum
selection clause. By contrast, a permissive forum selection clause, as its
name suggests, merely permits the parties to sue in the chosen forum, but
does not preclude them from suing elsewhere.10 Mandatory forum
selection clauses tend to be more common because they are seen as
providing a greater measure of certainty to the parties.
In an ideal world, parties would sue in the place they designated in
an exclusive forum selection clause. However, we do not live in an
ideal world, and parties often flout the obligations that they assumed
under a forum selection clause. When they do so, a court other than
the court chosen in the forum selection clause must decide what to
do. Should it proceed with the litigation despite the clause? Or,
should it dismiss or transfer the proceedings? In other words, the
forum must decide what effect the forum selection clause has on its
ability to hear the case. This will require a court to answer some
pivotal questions: Is the forum selection clause valid? Is the clause, in
fact, mandatory? Does the clause encompass the dispute at issue? The
answers to these questions will determine what a court will do next.
In federal court, once a court determines that the clause is valid,
mandatory, and encompasses the dispute at issue, it will usually
dismiss or transfer the case. A federal court will dismiss an action if
the forum designated in the forum selection clause is either a foreign
country or a state court,11 and it will transfer an action if the designated
9. These are sometimes referred to as “exclusive” and “non-exclusive.” See also
Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A
Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 56 n.1 (1992) (“Some civilian
commentators use the term ‘derogation agreement’ to describe exclusive forum
agreements, [and] ‘prorogation agreement’ to describe non-exclusive forum agreements.”).
10. Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 768 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Our
caselaw recognizes a sharp distinction between mandatory and permissive [forum
selection clauses]. A mandatory [forum selection clause] affirmatively requires that
litigation arising from the contract be carried out in a given forum. By contrast, a
permissive [forum selection clause] is only a contractual waiver of personal-jurisdiction
and venue objections if litigation is commenced in the specified forum.”).
11. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49,
60–61 (2013) (“[T]he appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing
to a state or foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Section
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forum is another federal court.12 This is its way of “enforcing” the clause;
by shutting litigants out of the federal forum, it indirectly forces litigants
to the place chosen in their forum selection clause.13
Importantly, dismissal or transfer is not automatic. It is effectuated
through the forum’s procedural mechanisms and rules. A federal
court, faced with a valid forum selection clause in favor of another
federal court, will usually14 transfer the case to that other federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.15 This section authorizes transfer to
another district court “for the convenience of parties and witnesses”

1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens for the
subset of cases in which the transferee forum is within the federal court system; in
such cases, Congress has replaced the traditional remedy of outright dismissal with
transfer . . . . For the remaining set of cases calling for a nonfederal forum, § 1404(a)
has no application, but the residual doctrine of forum non conveniens ‘has
continuing application in federal courts’. . . . And because both § 1404(a) and the
forum non conveniens doctrine from which it derives entail the same balancing-ofinterests standard, courts should evaluate a forum-selection clause pointing to a
nonfederal forum in the same way that they evaluate a forum-selection clause
pointing to a federal forum.”).
12. Id. at 52 (“Instead, a forum-selection clause may be enforced by a motion to
transfer under § 1404(a), which provides that ‘[f]or the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or
division to which all parties have consented.’”).
13. Even though this Article largely treats transfer and dismissal as though they
were equivalent (i.e., the forum is declining to hear the case), the two are very
different remedies. See Robin Effron, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Forum Non
Conveniens, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 693, 708–09 (2015) (“[A] forum non conveniens
dismissal can have a much greater impact on the outcome of a case, both as to issues of
liability and the quantum of recovery. Much scholarship, such as the Clermont and
Eisenberg study that demonstrated that § 1404(a) transfers . . . can have a significant
effect on case outcomes, acknowledges that forum non conveniens dismissals are a
different world altogether.”).
14. For a case that refused to transfer the action, see Connex Railroad LLC v.
AXA Corp. Sols. Assurance, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
15. Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 766 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Atlantic
Marine . . . clarified the proper mechanism for enforcing [forum selection clauses].
That dispute concerned [a forum selection clause] pointing to a U.S. court; the
Court held that the proper mechanism for enforcing such a clause is a motion for
transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Court also specified that the
proper mechanism to enforce [a forum selection clause] that calls for litigation in a
domestic state court or in a foreign court is through a motion to dismiss on grounds
of [forum non conveniens]. The Court further announced the effect that a
mandatory and enforceable [forum selection clause] should have on the § 1404(a)
and [forum non conveniens] analyses.”).
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and “in the interest of justice.”16 It is the federal equivalent of the
common law forum non conveniens doctrine.17 When federal courts
are faced with a valid and enforceable forum selection clause in favor
of another state, they must give primacy to the forum selection
clause. Accordingly, they do not conduct a “normal” forum non
conveniens analysis—i.e., looking at whether public and private
interest factors warrant dismissal.18 Instead, a court considering
transfer in light of a mandatory forum selection clause may only
examine public interest factors in the transfer analysis.19 This is
because, by entering into the forum selection clause in the first place,
the parties have effectively waived their right to challenge the chosen
forum as inconvenient.20
The same general analysis applies where the clause nominates a
foreign court or a state court in the forum selection clause. However,
in this case, a federal court would resort to the common law doctrine

16. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
17. Effron, supra note 13, at 696 (“The Atlantic Marine opinion emphasized that
when Congress drafted § 1404(a), the intent was to codify the existing doctrine of
forum non conveniens for the subset of cases where transfer is sought within the
federal system . . . .”). Professor Effron argues that the Supreme Court in Atlantic
Marine “overstated the equivalence between these two doctrines” and that “there are
good policy reasons for affirming that § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens are
parallel but distinct doctrines.” Id. at 702–03.
18. Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49,
62–63 (2013).
19. Id. at 64. Private-interest factors include:
relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the
action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)). The public-interest factors include: the administrative
difficulties that arise from court congestion; the locality’s interest in having localized
controversies decided close to home; and the interest in having the trial of a diversity case
in a forum that is familiar with the law. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09.
20. There are two other ways that the Supreme Court indicated that the forum
selection clause would impact the analysis, neither of which is germane for the
purpose of this Article. First, the plaintiff’s choice of forum merits no deference,
since the plaintiff has violated a forum selection clause. Atl. Marine Const. Co., 571
U.S. at 63. Second, if the case is transferred under § 1404, the transferee court will
apply its own choice of law rules to the dispute (i.e., the Van Dusen rule which
requires that a transferee court apply the choice of law rules of the transferor court
does not apply). Id. at 64–66.
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of forum non conveniens, with the necessary adjustments mandated
by the presence of a forum selection clause.21 The law in state courts
is similar, with the obvious difference being that state courts do not
have the power to transfer cases to another state.22 State courts will
usually employ some version of the forum non conveniens doctrine
or specific state law on forum selection agreements to dismiss an
action where the parties have entered into a valid forum selection
clause nominating a court in another state or country.23
II. WHEN FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES MEET CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES
Things become considerably more complicated when forum
selection clauses meet choice of law clauses.24 A typical forum
selection clause will provide something to the effect that “any and all
disputes arising out of, or related to, this contract will be adjudicated
exclusively in State A.” As discussed above, oftentimes a party will
choose to file suit in State B in contravention of the forum selection

21. Id. at 66 n.8 (“[T]he same standards should apply to motions to dismiss
for forum non conveniens in cases involving valid forum-selection clauses pointing to
state or foreign forums.”); Sorensen, supra note 8, at 2549 (“Section 1404(a) and the
doctrine of forum non conveniens are now firmly established as appropriate
procedural mechanisms for enforcement of forum-selection clauses.”).
22. Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Interpretation and Effect of Permissive Forum Selection
Clauses Under U.S. Law, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 127, 141 (2018).
23. See Buxbaum, supra note 22, at 141 (“There is no procedural mechanism by
which a state court can transfer a case to a more convenient forum in another state
(or another country). However, a defendant can move to dismiss a case on the basis
of inconvenience, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Almost all states
adhere to this common law doctrine . . . . Although there is some variation among
the states, in essence they follow the same approach that was announced as a rule of
federal common law in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.”); Michael D. Moberly & Carolyn F.
Burr, Enforcing Forum Selection Clauses in State Court, 39 SW. L. REV. 265, 276–77 (2009)
(“Although Bremen arose under the federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court’s analysis had an enormous influence on the enforceability of forum
selection clauses in subsequent state court litigation.”). But see Kevin M. Clermont,
Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 648 (2015) (noting
that “[s]ome U.S. states still consider forum-selection clauses to be per se
unenforceable . . . while other states sometimes ignore them by giving them less
weight than other contracts . . .”).
24. Mullenix, supra note 5, at 346–47 (“If forum-selection cases are somewhat
unsettling in their analytical methodology, then forum-selection cases complicated by
a concurrent choice-of-law provision are even more daunting. . . . Although some
courts quite sensibly ignore the presence of a concurrent choice-of-law clause,”
others “have been irresistibly drawn to this ‘intellectual tar baby.’”).
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clause.25 The defendant will likely resist litigating in State B and ask
State B to dismiss or transfer the suit. The plaintiff, on the other hand,
will probably raise issues related to the validity, enforceability, or
interpretation26 of the forum selection clause in order to avoid suit in
State A. For instance, the plaintiff may argue that the forum selection
clause is invalid and therefore should not be given effect. The plaintiff’s
goal, of course, is to keep the case in the courts of State B.
Questions of validity focus on whether the forum selection clause
was validly formed27 and whether there are reasons not to enforce the
clause.28 When dealing with the validity of forum selection clauses,

25. Professor Symonedies provides a very detailed framework for thinking about
cases involving forum selection and choice of law clauses. His article divides the cases
into three categories:
The first category includes cases in which the action is filed in the court
chosen in the [forum selection] clause (“Scenario 1”). The second category
encompasses all cases in which the action is filed in another court. For
purposes of analysis, these cases are divided into two subcategories: (a) cases
in which the [forum selection] clause is not accompanied by a choice-of-law
clause (“Scenario 2”); and (b) cases in which the [forum selection] clause is
accompanied by a choice-of-law clause, usually contained in the same
contract (“Scenario 3”).
Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1121–22. As Professor Symeonides notes, “[Scenario 3]
occurs far more frequently than either Scenario 1 or Scenario 2.” Id. at 1135.
26. See Sorensen, supra note 8, at 2546 n.227 (“A brief clarification of
terminology: courts often use the terms ‘validity’ and ‘enforceability’ or
‘enforcement’ of forum-selection clause interchangeably. There is, however, a
meaningful difference between the terms. This Note uses the term ‘validity’ to
describe the inquiry into whether a given forum-selection clause is effective and
binding as a matter of substantive law and uses the term ‘enforceability’ to describe
the inquiry into whether a given forum-selection clause should be enforced.”).
27. This would entail, inter alia, determining whether there was mutual assent
and whether the forum selection clause complied with any required formalities.
28. A forum selection clause may be unenforceable, for instance, if it is
unconscionable, procured by fraud, against public policy, or the product of undue
influence or duress. Buxbaum, supra note 22, at 133 (“Like any clause in a contract, a
forum selection clause can be challenged as invalid on the basis of formal defects
(for instance, the absence of a required writing) or defects in the consent of one of
the parties (for instance, that it was procured by duress, fraud, mistake, or the like).
Formal validity is rarely an issue in practice, and allegations of duress and other
similar practices are rare. However, parties frequently challenge the validity of forum
selection clauses contained in adhesion contracts on the basis of unconscionability
. . . .”). As a matter of contract law, the term “invalid” is probably inapt, though this
Article continues to use that term because it is in common usage in this context. If a
contract was not formed, then it is not “invalid”—it simply does not exist.
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the analysis is a little muddy—at least in federal courts. This is
because it is not clear whether federal courts sitting in diversity
should use federal law or state law to determine the validity of a
forum selection clause.29 One commentator explains that the split of
authority is “rooted in two distinct qualities of forum-selection clauses:
(1) they are agreements relating to the forum for adjudication which
may or may not be enforceable; and (2) they are contractual
agreements which may or may not be enforceable.”30 In practice, there
is usually a great deal of overlap between federal and state law31 on
the validity of forum selection clauses, so it may not matter much
which law a court applies.32

Additionally, doctrines such as undue influence, unconscionability, duress, etc.
render a contract voidable or unenforceable, not “invalid.”
29. Kermit Roosevelt III & Bethan R. Jones, Adrift on Erie: Characterizing ForumSelection Clauses, 52 AKRON L. REV. 297, 314 (2018) (“If suit is brought in federal court
on the basis of diversity, and a contract between the parties contains a forumselection clause, should its validity be determined under the Bremen standard, or
under the state law that governs the contract?”).
30. Sorensen, supra note 8, at 2548; see also id. at 2548–49 (“Courts that dwell on
the first quality reason that forum-selection clauses are simply venue agreements, i.e.,
they indicate the parties’ agreed-upon venue for adjudication of their disputes.
Then, eliding the distinction between validity and enforceability, these courts assert
that, since venue is manifestly a question of federal procedural law, enforcement and
validity of such clauses is a question also governed by federal law. . . . Courts that
dwell on the second quality, i.e., the fact that forum clauses are contractual provisions
whose validity is determined by substantive law, recognize that the ’construction of
contracts is usually a matter of state, not federal, common law,’ . . . .”).
31. State and federal courts generally apply the guidance laid out by the
Supreme Court in the Bremen case. See Jon A. Jacobson, Your Place or Mine: The
Enforceability of Choice-of-Law/Forum Clauses in International Securities Contracts, 8 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 469, 480 (1998) (“Thus, the court identified four grounds (the
Bremen factors) sufficient to invalidate a [forum selection] clause: (1) if the contract
were obtained through ‘fraud or overreaching’; (2) if the forum were so remote that
the complaining party would ‘for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in
court’; (3) if enforcement would be ‘unreasonable and unjust’; and (4) if
enforcement ‘would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which the suit
is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.’”).
32. See, e.g., IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606,
611 (7th Cir. 2006) (“At the black-letter level, Illinois law concerning the validity of
forum selection clauses is materially the same as federal law.”); Cornice Techs., Inc. v.
Affinity Dental Prods., Inc., No. 04-cv-01133-EWN-OES, 2005 WL 1712124, at *7 n.4 (D.
Colo. July 21, 2005) (“The parties have not addressed the choice of law issues surrounding
the forum selection clause. The choice of law issue is whether the court should [determine
the enforceability of] the forum selection clause under California state law, Colorado state
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Things become considerably more involved, however, when parties
have included a choice of law clause in their contract. Many contracts
that contain a forum selection clause will also contain a choice of law
clause.33 A typical choice of law clause provides that the contract “will
be governed by the law of State A.”34 Using the example above, a State
B court will need to decide what law applies to determine the validity
of the forum selection clause nominating State A.35 In particular,
should a court use the parties’ chosen law to determine the validity of
the forum selection clause?36 The majority of federal courts hold that
the parties’ chosen law should not govern questions of validity, since
such questions are inherently procedural and therefore governed by
federal law.37 State courts follow a similar practice, characterizing
law, or federal common law. Since there are no material differences between these various
laws, I find it unnecessary to decide the issue.” (citations omitted)).
33. Borchers, supra note 9, at 81 (noting that it is “quite common” for a “forum
selection clause [to be] accompanied by a choice-of-law clause”).
34. See John F. Coyle & Christopher R. Drahozal, An Empirical Study of Dispute
Resolution Clauses in International Supply Contracts, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 323, 335
(2019) (“In theory, a choice-of-law clause may be framed in a near-infinite number of
ways. In practice, however, most clauses are framed in one of three specific ways.
First, a choice-of-law clause may state that the contract will be ‘interpreted’ in
accordance with the laws of a particular jurisdiction. Second, a clause may stipulate
that the contract will be ‘construed’ in accordance with the laws of that jurisdiction.
Third, a clause may provide that the contract will be ‘governed by’ the laws of that
jurisdiction. The question of whether the precise phrase utilized in the clause matters
has generated a split among US courts. Most courts have held that ‘interpret,’
‘construe,’ and ‘govern’ all mean the same thing.” (footnote omitted)).
35. Typically, the forum selection clause and choice of law clause will match up.
But see MBC Fin. Servs. Ltd. v. Bos. Merch. Fin., Ltd., 704 F. App’x 14, 17 & n.1 (2d
Cir. 2017) (examining a corporate client agreement with a Swiss forum selection
clause and a British Virgin Islands choice of law clause).
36. Some commentators suggest that a court could apply the law of state
nominated in the forum selection clause. See Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1135
(“[T]he seized court has . . . three options for the enforceability and interpretation
of the [forum selection] clause . . . namely: (1) apply the internal law of the seized
forum—the lex fori; (2) apply the substantive law of the forum designated in the
[forum selection] clause; or (3) apply the law that governs the underlying contract—
lex contractus.”). The rationale for applying the law of the state chosen in the forum
selection clause is evasive.
37. For those courts that view the validity of a forum selection clause as a
substantive matter under Erie—and therefore governed by state law—there is a
secondary question to be answered: does state law characterize the issue as
substantive or procedural for conflict of laws purposes? In other words, a federal
court applying state law must ask whether to apply forum law, or the law dictated by
the forum’s conflict of laws rules. Buxbaum, supra note 22, at 151 (“Most federal
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questions of validity as procedural and therefore governed by forum
law, not the chosen law.38 Oftentimes, the practice is largely reflexive,
with courts providing little to no discussion of the rationale for
applying forum law to questions of validity.39
Although there is not much academic discussion on the topic,
there is some disagreement on whether forum law or chosen law
should govern questions related to the validity of forum selection
clauses. Professor Yackee argues that the parties’ chosen law should
govern these issues.40 He maintains that forum law is a “poor choice”
to govern forum selection clauses for the following reasons:
[I]t risks subjecting the contract to multiple laws, it makes it
difficult for parties to anticipate at the contract drafting stage
which law will actually be applied to [the forum selection clause], it
may promote forum shopping, and it ignores the parties’
bargained-for jurisdictional expectations by overlooking a
contract’s explicit or implicit choice of law.41

Accordingly, Professor Yackee’s position is that forum selection
agreements “should be governed first and foremost by the parties’

courts sitting in diversity have concluded that the validity of a forum selection clause
is clearly procedural, and should be controlled by the Bremen rule as a matter of
federal common law. By this approach, a federal court simply applies the rule of
presumptive validity directly. Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion,
characterizing questions of validity as a matter of substantive contract law. This
analysis should logically begin by applying local choice of law rules. Some courts follow
that approach, which generally leads them to determine validity pursuant to the law
chosen by the parties. However, here, much like state courts, federal courts often
skip over the choice of law analysis. They simply apply the substantive law of the
forum in considering the validity of a forum selection clause.” (footnotes omitted)).
38. See Clermont, supra note 23, at 649.
39. Id. (“Almost all American courts apply their own law, the lex fori [to forum
selection agreements]. Most do so with little or no thinking.”).
40. Jason Webb Yackee, Choice of Law Considerations in the Validity & Enforcement of
International Forum Selection Agreements: Whose Law Applies?, 9 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 43, 47 (2004).
41. Id. at 83. Professor Yackee makes this comment with respect to international
forum selection agreements, but the arguments would theoretically hold true in the
domestic context as well.
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explicit choice of law.”42 And, indeed, a few U.S. courts have applied the
parties’ chosen law to questions concerning validity and enforceability.43
Professor Clermont, on the other hand, argues that forum law
should apply to determine the validity of forum selection clauses. He
provides a host of policy reasons as to why this should be the case,
including arguments related to forum control over jurisdiction, the
procedural nature of the issue, and the potential to weed out abusive
clauses.44 Professor Symeonides concludes that “[a]ll things
considered, Clermont has the better arguments.”45 He is particularly
persuaded by the argument that if a forum were to apply the chosen
law to test the validity of a forum selection clause this would unduly
punish weaker parties who have likely “agreed” to unfavorable choice of
law clauses.46 Professor Symeonides notes that in many cases, these choice
of law clauses are “usually drafted by the corporate defendant, virtually
never negotiated, and often unsuspectingly imposed on the weak party.”47
Despite Professor Yackee’s criticism of the practice, and a handful
of outlier cases, it seems to be settled law that the forum will use its
own law48 to determine the validity of a forum selection clause
contained in a contract that also includes a choice of law clause.
According to Professor Symeonides, the “vast majority” of U.S. courts

42. Id. at 94. Somewhat strangely, Professor Yackee posits that, “In the event that
the parties have not made an explicit choice, the law of the designated forum should
govern the [forum selection agreement]. That law has the highest probability of
corresponding to the parties’ bargained-for jurisdictional expectations in the
absence of an explicit choice of law.” Id.
43. See Vinci v. V.F. Corp., No. 2:17-cv-00091, 2018 WL 339942, at *3 (D. Vt. Jan.
9, 2018) (federal court in Vermont applying the parties’ chosen law, California law,
to the enforceability of the forum selection clause in the Agreement); Bahl v. N.Y.
Coll. of Osteopathic Med. of N.Y. Inst. of Tech., No. 14-cv-4020 (AKT), 2017 WL
5479655, at *8–9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (federal court in New York applying the
chosen law, Indiana law, to determine whether the forum selection clause at issue
was unconscionable); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 329 P.3d 1264, 1268
(Mont. 2014) (Montana court applying California law, the chosen law, to determine
whether the forum selection clause was valid).
44. For a list of the rationales, see Clermont, supra note 23, at 654–56.
45. Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1154.
46. Id. at 1154–55.
47. Id. at 1155.
48. By “forum law,” I mean federal law in federal court, and state law in state
court (with no reference to the choice of law clause).
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apply forum law to questions of validity and “more often than not, do
so without a choice-of-law inquiry.”49
The law gets even more complex when it comes to questions of
forum selection clause interpretation.50 A court will often need to
interpret a forum selection clause to determine, for instance, whether
the claim at issue even falls within the purview of the clause.51
Questions of interpretation usually fall within one of the following
three52 categories: (1) Is the forum selection clause mandatory or
permissive? In other words, does the clause require the parties to
submit their dispute to the chosen forum, or merely permit them to

49. Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1152; see also Clermont, supra note 23, at 652–53
(“The typical treatise approach is to describe the American cases as split between lex
fori and the chosen law. That description suffers from a serious selection effect:
looking only at cases that decide the point is inapt because they are a biased subset of
the run of all cases (or all disputes). The great mass of cases presenting the problem
do not expressly allude to it at all, be that the fault of the judges or the lawyers. The
few cases that discuss the problem tend to split; they draw all the attention of treatise
writers; the result is to make this puzzle look a good deal more puzzling than it is.
What are the cases that ignore the problem doing? They, of course, are applying lex
fori. So, if we were to consider all American cases, we would say that the vast majority
apply lex fori. Indeed, it appears that the courts ‘reflexively apply lex fori’ even in the
face of a choice-of-law clause. We could almost say the question is settled.”).
50. See Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1120 (“If the [forum selection] clause is
enforceable, the court may have to answer other questions regarding the meaning,
scope, and effect of the clause. Examples of such questions are whether the clause
encompasses pre-contract or non-contractual—in addition to contractual—claims,
whether it binds non-signatories or other third parties, and whether it confers
exclusive or nonexclusive jurisdiction to the chosen court—sometimes referred to as
‘mandatory’ or ‘permissive’ clauses, respectively.”); see also Ashlee Schaller,
Interpretation of Forum Selection Clauses: A Survey of Select English- and German-Speaking
Jurisdictions, 44 N.C.J. INT’L L. 117, 119 (2018). For a case that presented multiple
interpretative issues, see Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 427 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“(1) Is the forum-selection provision mandatory or permissive? . . . (2) Are all of Mr.
Yavuz’s claims governed by the provision, or only some? . . . (3) Does the clause bind
Mr. Yavuz with respect to claims against all the defendants, or with respect to only his
claims against FPM, or perhaps only those against FPM and Mr. Adi?”).
51. Despite their significance, many forum selection clauses are not drafted
clearly. Borchers, supra note 9, at 82–83 (“Some inartful clauses, however, have
proved especially challenging.”); Clermont, supra note 23, at 646 (“Many more of the
litigated cases, however, turn on how to interpret these clauses, most often as a result
of the drafting lawyers’ failings.”).
52. Professor Coyle adds a fourth category: whether parties agreed to litigate in
state or federal court. See Coyle, supra note 2, at 1826.
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do so?53 (2) Are the claims at issue within the scope of the forum
selection clause? That is, does the clause require that the particular
claim or claims be resolved pursuant to the forum selection clause?54
(3) Is the party resisting enforcement subject to the forum selection
clause?55 These questions are often dispositive, so a great deal turns
on how a court chooses to interpret the forum selection clause.56
Returning to the example above, assume that the plaintiff advances
a statutory claim in State B, alleging that the claim is not a “dispute[]
arising out of, or related to, th[e] contract.” The task of State B will
be to apply some body of law to decide whether the claim falls within
the scope of the forum selection clause. If State B finds that the claim
does fall within the scope of the clause, and provided there are no
other interpretative issues, the court would likely dismiss or transfer
the action.
Up until fairly recently, U.S. courts treated issues related to the
interpretation of forum selection clauses the same way that they
treated issues of validity and enforceability—that is, they applied
forum law to all these questions.57 In the 2000s, however, courts
began to pay a bit more attention to the specific issue of whether
forum law should be applied to interpret forum selection clauses
when the parties had selected a different law to govern their

53. Even though it is surprisingly easy to craft exclusive jurisdiction clauses (i.e.,
simply use the word “exclusive”), many parties fail to draft them clearly.
54. Professor Borchers notes that this is “[t]he most frequently-litigated
[interpretation] issue . . . .” Borchers, supra note 9, at 84. This exercise can get very
complex. See, e.g., TSI USA, LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:16-cv-2177-L, 2017 WL
106835, at *2–3, 7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2017) (applying California law to determine
whether a forum selection clause survived termination of the contract when not
mentioned in a survival clause), aff’d, No. 3:16-cv-2177-L, 2017 WL 3209399 (N.D.
Tex. June 19, 2017).
55. “The more difficult question, though, has been the appropriate treatment of
persons who are parties to the litigation, but not parties to the forum [selection
clause].” Borchers, supra note 9, at 85; see also Monika L. Woodard, Comment, Ghosts
Have Rights Too! A New Era in Contractual Rights: Third-Party Invocation in Forum
Selection Clauses, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 467, 467–69 (2014).
56. See, e.g., Connex R.R. LLC v. AXA Corp. Sols. Assurance, 209 F. Supp. 3d
1147, 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“The issue of whether French or federal common law
governs the interpretation of the forum selection clause in the Policy is
determinative of whether the clause is valid in the present litigation.”).
57. See, e.g., Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 427 (10th Cir. 2006).
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dispute.58 One of the first court of appeals cases to examine this issue
was the 10th Circuit in Yavuz v. 61 MM Ltd.59 The court in Yavuz
noted that the choice of law issue was one of first impression and had
received little scholarly or judicial attention in the context of
international contracts.60 The court held that the forum selection
clause should be interpreted using Swiss law, the law chosen by the
parties in their contract,61 reasoning that:
If the parties to an international contract agree on a forumselection clause that has a particular meaning under the law of a
specific jurisdiction, and the parties agree that the contract is to be
interpreted under the law of that jurisdiction, then respect for the
parties’ autonomy and the demands of predictability in international
transactions require courts to give effect to the meaning of the forumselection clause under the chosen law . . . . [W]e now hold that under
federal law the courts should ordinarily honor an international
commercial agreement’s forum-selection provision as construed under
the law specified in the agreement’s choice-of-law provision. The practice,
although apparently merely reflexive, of applying the law of the
jurisdiction in which the suit is pending (lex fori), is unsatisfactory.62

Most other appellate courts that have considered this issue have
followed the approach endorsed in Yavuz—i.e., using the parties’
chosen law to adjudicate matters related to the interpretation of the
forum selection clause.63
Professor Symeonides examined recent cases involving the intersection
between forum selection and choice of law clauses. His results show a very
clear trend toward applying forum law to issues of validity and
enforceability, and the parties’ chosen law to issues of interpretation.64 He
58. Schaller, supra note 50, at 120 (“More specifically, in interpreting forum selection
clauses, should the court apply the law of the jurisdiction in which it sits (the law of the
forum) or apply the law chosen by the parties to govern their agreement?”).
59. 465 F.3d 418, 427 (10th Cir. 2006).
60. Id. at 427.
61. Id. at 430–31.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Collins v. Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d 176, 185 (3d Cir. 2017); Barnett v.
DynCorp Int’l, L.L.C., 831 F.3d 296, 308 (5th Cir. 2016); Albemarle Corp. v.
AstraZeneca UK, Ltd., 628 F.3d 643, 643 (4th Cir. 2010); Dunne v. Libbra 330 F.3d
1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2003); Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 954 F.2d 763, 767
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Brenner v. Nat’l Outdoor Leadership Sch., 20 F. Supp. 3d 709, 718
(D. Minn. 2014). But see Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 513
(9th Cir. 1988) (choosing to use federal law to interpret forum selection clauses).
64. Professor Symeonides uses the terms “validity” and “enforceability”
interchangeably. For an example of a recent case that applied federal law to the issue
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noted that in 2017, there were nineteen appellate cases that involved the
intersection between choice of law and choice of forum clauses.65 He
observed that: (a) Eight cases involved only questions of enforceability
and they all applied forum law; (b) Six cases involved only questions of
interpretation, five of them applied the chosen law, and one applied
forum law; and (c) Five cases involved both interpretation and
enforceability, two applied forum law to both issues, and three applied
forum law to questions of enforceability and the chosen law to
questions of interpretation.66 What these results show is that courts are
generally applying forum law to issues of validity and enforceability and
applying the parties’ chosen law to questions of interpretation. Prior to
analyzing whether this bifurcation between validity and interpretation is
appropriate, I propose a framework for thinking about the intersection
between choice of law and choice of forum clauses.
III. FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN FORUM SELECTION
CLAUSES AND CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES
Because of the complexity of the validity, enforceability, and
interpretation analysis, it is helpful for courts approaching the confluence
of choice of law clauses and forum selection clauses to have some sort
of governing framework for the analysis—that is, some start point and
some end point.67 Otherwise, the issues all tend to bleed together.68
Accordingly, I propose the following four-step framework.69
of interpretation, see XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, LC, No. W-16-CA-00447-RP,
2017 WL 5505340, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2017) (“This Court assumes ‘not only that
“[f]ederal law governs the determination of whether an enforceable forum selection
clause exists[,]” but also that federal law controls whether [Plaintiff’s] lawsuit falls
within the scope of the forum selection clause.’” (citation omitted)).
65. Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1135.
66. Id. at 1135–36.
67. Lately, courts have been employing the following four-step framework
articulated by the Second Circuit in Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 383–84
(2d Cir. 2007): (1) was the clause reasonably communicated to the party resisting
enforcement; (2) was the clause mandatory or permissive; (3) are the claims at issue
subject to the forum selection clause; and (4) would enforcement of the clause be
unreasonable or unjust? Unfortunately, this framework is under-inclusive, as it does
not include the full gamut of validity and enforceability issues, nor does it reference
the predicate choice of law questions.
68. Schaller, supra note 50, at 120 n.6 (“[M]any courts simply blur the issues of
enforceability and interpretation of forum selection clauses together into one overall
analysis.”).
69. Although this Article only focuses on Step Three of the proposed framework, it is
necessary to situate the discussion in the larger context of how the analysis would play out.
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A. Step One: Validity and Enforceability of Choice of Law Clause
First, courts should consider the validity and enforceability of the
choice of law clause contained in the contract. The validity inquiry
entails whether the clause is properly formed as a matter of contract
law, and whether there are any contractual barriers to enforcement
(e.g., unconscionability).70 Currently, “very few courts focus on the
question whether the choice-of-law clause is itself enforceable as a
matter of contract law.”71 But, if there is no valid choice of law clause,
the “chosen law” will be irrelevant.
Then, the court must consider whether to enforce the clause as a
conflict of laws matter. This means that a court will apply section 187 of
the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws—or whatever other approach
the forum has adopted—to ensure that it is comfortable enforcing the
choice of law clause.72 If the choice of law clause is invalid or unenforceable,
the court must then determine what law to apply both to the underlying
dispute and to the interpretation of the forum selection clause.
B. Step Two: Validity of Forum Selection Clause
Second, courts must determine the validity of the forum selection
clause—i.e., is the forum selection clause valid as a matter of contract
law? As discussed above, the common practice is for a court to apply

70. See Jillian R. Camarote, Comment, A Little More Contract Law with My Contracts
Please: The Need to Apply Unconscionability Directly to Choice-of-Law Clauses, 39 SETON
HALL L. REV. 605, 607 (2009) (arguing that courts need to initially examine the
choice of law clause as a contractual matter, using the doctrine of unconscionability,
before embarking on a conflicts analysis).
71. William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and
Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 3 (2006). There is also the open question of what
law determines whether a choice of law clause is valid.
72. Very few courts currently engage in this analysis. For a court that did apply
section 187, see Collins v. Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Parties’
freedom to choose the law applicable to their agreements is not without boundaries
in New Jersey law. New Jersey looks to Restatement § 187 to determine under what
circumstances a choice-of-law clause will not be respected.”). See also TSI USA, LLC, v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-2177-L, 2017 WL 106835, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11,
2017), aff’d, No. 3:16-CV-2177-L, 2017 WL 3209399 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2017). Much
more typical is the approach in Hous. Casualty Co. v. Thomas Linderman Graham, Inc.,
No. 1:17CV40, 2017 WL 3172415, at *2 (M.D.N.C. July 25, 2017) (“‘“[T]he body of
law selected in an otherwise valid choice-of-law clause” governs the interpretation of
a forum-selection clause.’ Here, the Agreement selects North Carolina law (Doc. 10–
1 at 2), so the court will apply North Carolina law to determine whether the forumselection clause encompasses HCC’s claims.” (citations omitted)).
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forum law to the issue.73 If the court determines that the forum
selection clause is invalid, then it will proceed as though no forum
selection clause was present. Conversely, if a court determines that
the clause is valid and enforceable, then a court will turn to either
Step Three (if applicable), or Step Four.
C. Step Three: Interpretation of the Forum Selection Clause
Third, a court must interpret the forum selection clause. This may
involve determining whether the clause is mandatory or permissive,
and whether the claim at issue falls within the scope of the clause. Here,
there is an open question as to whether forum law, or the chosen law,
should govern. If the chosen law governs, there is an additional step of
determining what that chosen law is exactly, which, in the international
context, may require examination of international treaties and involve
the doctrine of renvoi.74 If the parties have not entered into a choice of
law clause, a court must decide whether to apply forum law to
interpretation issues, or whether to conduct a choice of law analysis to
ascertain the applicable law. In other words, a court faces a choice of law
analysis whether or not the parties have chosen a governing law.
D. Step Four: Effect of Forum Selection Clause
Fourth, a court must decide what effect to give the forum selection
clause.75 Here, the exact analysis will differ depending on the litigation
posture. The most common scenario involves a court other than the one
chosen in the forum selection clause determining whether it should
hear the action before it or dismiss/transfer the proceedings in light of
the forum selection clause.76 If a court determines that the clause is
mandatory and that the claim falls within the scope of the clause, it will

73. See supra note 48.
74. Some courts might impose a true/false conflict analysis as a predicate to
applying the chosen law. See Brenner v. Nat’l Outdoor Leadership Sch., 20 F. Supp.
3d 709, 715 (D. Minn. 2014) (“Because the court finds no conflict between
Minnesota and Wyoming law on any determinative issue relating to contract validity
or interpretation, a choice of law need not be made with regard to the first two
arguments and the court applies Minnesota law.”).
75. Roosevelt & Jones, supra note 29, at 317 (“The effect of those rights in federal
court is a question of federal procedural law. As with a § 1404(a) motion, a federal
court might decide that a valid forum-selection clause does not justify dismissal, and
it might decide that an invalid clause does.”).
76. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 52 (2013).
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ordinarily “enforce”77 the clause by dismissing or transferring its
proceedings. If a court determines that the clause is permissive, or
that it is mandatory but does not encompass the claims at issue, the
court will need to determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear the
claim and whether it should exercise that jurisdiction.78
***
As is apparent from the above, this is not an inquiry for the faint of
heart. It is an involved, multi-step analysis.79 There are several choice
of law issues presented by the above: What law should apply to the
validity and enforceability of a choice of law clause? What law should
apply to the validity of a forum selection clause? What law should
apply to interpret a forum selection clause? It seems that the
overwhelming majority of courts use forum law to gauge the validity
of both forum selection clauses and choice of law clauses. Courts are
divided, however, on the question presented at Step Three, what law
should apply to issues of forum selection clause interpretation.80

77. Technically, a court is not enforcing the clause. It simply is deciding what
effect to give the clause in the proceedings before it.
78. See Lavera Skin Care N. Am., Inc. v. Laverana GmbH & Co. KG, No. 2:13-CV02311-RSM, 2014 WL 7338739, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2014) (“Where a forumselection clause is instead permissive, the vast majority of courts that have addressed
the issue have rejected Atlantic Marine’s application and applied the traditional
forum non conveniens test.”), aff’d, 696 F. App’x 837 (9th Cir. 2017); see also
Buxbaum, supra note 23, at 143–44 (“[S]ome courts give no special weight to a
permissive forum selection clause when considering these motions. Other courts,
however, recognize a few ways in which the existence of a permissive forum selection
clause might affect the analysis.”).
79. See, e.g., Brenner, 20 F. Supp. at 715 (“Brenner opposes the instant motion and
argues that (1) the Agreement is invalid because it lacks independent consideration;
(2) the Agreement and its forum selection clause are unenforceable against her as a
non-party to the contract and as trustee to Plotkin’s heirs and next-of-kin; (3) the
forum selection clause is invalid because it is a contract of adhesion and (4) the
forum selection clause is inapplicable to tort claims. Because the court finds no
conflict between Minnesota and Wyoming law on any determinative issue relating to
contract validity or interpretation, a choice of law need not be made with regard to
the first two arguments and the court applies Minnesota law. As explained below, the
court applies federal law to the third argument, which concerns enforceability of the
forum selection clause, and refers to Minnesota law in a limited contract
interpretation inquiry. Finally, as explained below, the court applies Wyoming law to
resolve the fourth argument, which relates to interpretation of the forum selection
clause.” (citations omitted)).
80. See Indoor Billboard Nw. Inc. v. M2 Sys. Corp., 922 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160 (D.
Or. 2013) (“There is a split in the circuits as to the law that a federal court sitting in
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This Article argues that courts should apply forum law—not the
parties’ chosen law—to interpretation questions presented by forum
selection clauses. This position is somewhat against the grain of current
thinking on the topic, though there are certainly cases that apply forum
law to questions of interpretation.81 The leading case in this respect is
Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc.82 In that case, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that federal law should govern all issues related to
forum selection clauses, including issues of interpretation.83 It reasoned
that “because enforcement of a forum clause necessarily entails
interpretation of the clause before it can be enforced, federal law also
applies to interpretation of forum selection clauses.”84 The Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning for lumping interpretation in with issues of validity
and enforceability is simply that interpretation is part and parcel of
enforceability, and thus, all issues should be governed by federal law.85
Courts following the Ninth Circuit’s lead have used similar logic.86

diversity is to apply to interpret a forum-selection clause when the underlying
contract contains a choice-of-law provision.”).
81. A number of courts refuse to apply the parties’ chosen law to questions of
interpretation. See Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam); Connex R.R. v. AXA Corp. Sols. Assurance, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1149–50
(C.D. Cal. 2016); Found. Fitness Prods., LLC v. Free Motion Fitness, 121 F. Supp. 3d
1038, 1044 (D. Or. 2015); Lavera Skin Care, 2014 WL 7338739, at *5; Indoor Billboard,
922 F. Supp. 2d at 1161; Kiland v. Bos. Sci. Corp., No. C 10-4105 SBA, 2011 WL
1261130, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011); Sigma Six Techs., Inc. v. Nagarro, Inc., No. C
08-05633 JW, 2009 WL 2031771, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2009).
82. 858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988).
83. Id. at 513.
84. Id.
85. Sometimes issues of interpretation are, in fact, intertwined with issues of
validity and enforceability. TSI USA, LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-2177-L,
2017 WL 106835, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2012) (argument that forum selection
clause applied only during life of the contract and not after termination could be
characterized as issue of scope of the clause or validity of the clause), aff’d, No. 3:16CV-2177-L, 2017 WL 3209399 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2017).
86. Wong v. Partygaming, Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 827–28 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding
that “six Circuits have held that the enforceability of a forum selection clause
implicates federal procedure and should therefore be governed by federal law”
including the 9th Circuit); Avicenna Laser Tech., Inc. v. Nathaniel Grp., Inc., No. 0560996-CIV, 2005 WL 8154578, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2005) (“[D]etermining the
proper forum through the forum-selection clause is a procedural issue, even if it
involves principles of contract law. Accordingly, federal law applies and the Court
need not venture further into choice-of-law and Erie matters.”).
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The reasoning in Manetti-Farrow is not particularly detailed or
persuasive,87 but this Article nonetheless maintains that applying
forum law is, in fact, the better course of action. This is because there
are no compelling reasons to apply the parties’ chosen law to the
issue, and to apply the chosen law only creates the potential for
additional confusion and complication to result from this inquiry.
This is particularly so when the parties have chosen foreign law to
govern their contract.88 Accordingly, the remainder of this Article
provides less of an affirmative argument for applying forum law, and
more of an argument against applying the chosen law.
IV. EXAMINING THE STATED RATIONALES FOR APPLYING THE
CHOSEN LAW
Courts and commentators provide several reasons why forum
selection clauses should be interpreted in accordance with the
parties’ chosen law.89 First, they posit that a choice of law clause is an

87. See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 23, at 660 (“But in fact, there is no logical
compulsion to first determine what precisely a forum-selection clause means without
looking to the chosen law. A court could logically look to the chosen law to see what
the forum-selection clause means as to its coverage, and then apply lex fori to
determine whether the construed clause is enforceable.”).
88. Where the parties have chosen the law of a different U.S. state, it generally
will not matter whether a court applies federal, forum, or chosen law to the dispute
since the interpretative principles are very similar. See Prestige Oilfield Servs., LLC v.
Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. CV 18-1173 GBW/GJF, 2019 WL 764669, at *3 (D.N.M.
Feb. 21, 2019) (“In any event, the resolution of this Motion is governed by general
principles of contract interpretation. Neither party has cited to cases suggesting that
these principles are inapplicable, or applied differently, under the choice of law they
respectively champion—Oklahoma or federal common law. Thus, even if the choiceof-Oklahoma-law provision did not apply, application of these general principles
would mandate the same result.”); Hunnicutt v. CHF Sols., Inc., No. 10-CV-0042-CVEFHM, 2010 WL 1078470, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 18, 2010) (“The Court need not
resolve this issue because federal, Minnesota, and Oklahoma law regarding forum
selection clauses are substantially similar, and the interpretation and application of the
forum selection clause would not change based on the choice of law.”); Raydiant Tech.,
LLC v. Fly-N-Hog Media Grp., 439 S.W.3d 238, 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (“Both parties
cited Missouri case law in the trial court and did the same here. It was acknowledged at
oral argument, however, that the contract expressly provides that it is governed by
Arkansas law, such that we may need to consider that state’s law instead . . . . Thus we look
to Arkansas law, but would reach the same result under Missouri law.”).
89. See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 23, at 661 (“First, there is the background
policy of indulging party autonomy unless inappropriate. Second, there are the other
usual arguments in favor of giving the parties the power to choose the governing law,
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expression of party autonomy, and that parties should have the right
to choose which law governs the interpretation of the forum selection
clause in their contract. Second, and somewhat related, courts and
scholars maintain that interpreting a forum selection clause in
accordance with the chosen law respects the intentions of the parties.
Third, they argue that outcomes are more certain and predictable if
courts interpret forum selection clauses pursuant to the chosen law.
Fourth, courts and commentators assert that the interpretation of a
forum selection clause is a substantive (versus a procedural) issue, to
be determined in accordance with the parties’ chosen law. Fifth, they
maintain that since a forum selection clause is “part of” the contract,
there is no principled reason for singling it out for application of a
law other than the chosen law. Finally, they argue that interpreting a
forum selection clause in accordance with the parties’ chosen law
avoids forum shopping. Upon closer examination, none of these
rationales hold up.
A. The Party Autonomy Argument
One of the rationales provided in support of applying the parties’
chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause is that party autonomy
dictates that the parties should be free to select the law to govern all
aspects of their relationship. Indeed, Professor Yackee argues that all
issues regarding enforceability and interpretation should be left to the
law chosen by the parties: “[t]he routine enforcement of choice of law
clauses, and indeed the wide acceptance of the more general principle
of ‘party autonomy’ in [business to business] contracting generally,
suggests that courts should turn first and foremost to the law that the
parties have explicitly selected to govern their relationship.”90
The party autonomy argument, however, suffers from one major
weakness: parties do not have unfettered autonomy to select whatever
law they wish to govern their contractual relationship. American courts
have imposed limits on party choice. For instance, section 187 of the
such as curbing forum shopping. Third, there is the argument that the forumselection clause should have the same interpretation everywhere . . . .”).
90. Yackee, supra note 40, at 84; see also J. Zachary Courson, Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd.:
A New Federal Standard—Applying Contracting Parties’ Choice of Law to the Analysis of
Forum Selection Agreements, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 597, 597 (2008) (“Parties doing
business abroad face the very real prospect of litigating, unexpectedly, in foreign
courts under foreign law. Forum selection agreements and choice of law clauses
theoretically grant parties autonomy to predetermine the courts in which they will
litigate, as well as the law under which they will litigate.”).
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Restatement (Second) on the Conflict of Laws circumscribes the ability of
the parties to choose the law governing their agreement.91 Under this
section, the parties are not permitted to derogate from mandatory
law by way of a choice of law clause where the chosen law has no
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction, where there
is no other reasonable basis for the parties choice, or where
application of the chosen law would be contrary to the public policy
of the law of the state that would apply absent a choice of law clause.92
Moreover, parties are not permitted to choose a law to govern the
validity of a forum selection clause, even if they expressly indicate
such an intention in their contract. Many forum selection clauses
provide that the chosen law will govern all issues arising from or
related to the contract, including issues of whether a contract was validly
formed.93 Yet, U.S. courts have deliberately ignored such language,
characterizing issues of validity as a procedural matter to be governed by
the law of the forum, irrespective of the intentions of the parties.
For the purpose of this Article, the point is simply that invoking
party autonomy as a reason to apply the parties’ chosen law is not as
compelling as it may seem at first blush. This is because party
autonomy is already circumscribed by a forum’s choice of law rules,
and its characterization of the validity of a forum selection clause as a
procedural rather than substantive matter.
B. The Parties’ Intentions Argument
Perhaps the most persuasive argument in favor of having the chosen
law govern the interpretation of a forum selection clause is the parties’
intentions argument: “To ensure that the meaning given to a forum
selection clause corresponds with the parties’ legitimate expectations,
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 187 (1971).
92. Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA.
L. REV. 363, 372–73 (2003) (“Thus, section 187 explicitly authorizes letting the
contract override a mandatory law that would apply under the default choice-of-law
rule where there is a ‘reasonable basis’ for the contractual choice, unless the law of
the nonchosen state represents ‘fundamental policy’ and the nonchosen state ‘has a
materially greater interest’ than the chosen state in determining the issue.”).
93. McLarty Capital Partners SBIC, L.P. v. Brazda, No. 18CV2599 (DLC), 2018
WL 3104093, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2018) (“The validity, interpretation and
enforcement of this agreement . . . shall be governed by the laws of the State of New
York . . . .”); AlliantGroup, L.P. v. Mols, No. CV H-16-3114, 2017 WL 432810, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2017) (“Choice of Law/Jurisdiction/Venue: This Agreement shall be
governed in all respects, including, but not limited to, validity, interpretation, effect
and performance by the laws of the State of Texas.”).
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courts must apply the law contractually chosen by the parties to interpret
the clause.”94 Nearly all courts that apply the parties’ chosen law advance
some version of this argument.95 While the argument certainly sounds
good in theory—after all, who can be against giving effect to the will of the
parties in matters of contract law?—it does not hold up to closer scrutiny.
First, the argument meets a significant roadblock right at the outset. If
it is true that parties “intend” to have forum selection clauses interpreted
in accordance with the chosen law, then surely it is true that the parties
also “intend” to have matters related to validity of the forum selection
clause also governed by the chosen law. That is, it is silly to bifurcate
validity issues and interpretation issues and to simply declare that the
parties must have intended the latter to be governed by the chosen law.
Either the parties intended everything related to the contract—validity,
enforceability, interpretation—to be governed by the chosen law, or they
did not. Yet, as discussed above, when it comes to validity and
enforceability of the forum selection clause, the overwhelming majority
of courts proceed to apply forum law, not the parties’ chosen law.96
Seldom is a word said about the parties’ intentions in this respect, even
though many choice of law clauses expressly manifest the parties’
intentions that issues of validity should be governed by the chosen law. It is
disingenuous for courts to invoke the parties’ intentions when the issue
involves the interpretation of a forum selection clause, but to disregard
the matter entirely when it comes to validity and enforceability issues.
Second, the parties’ intentions argument must be considered in
light of the specific context in which it arises. Usually, a forum other
than the one selected in the forum selection clause is being asked to
determine whether it should proceed with the litigation notwithstanding
the clause. As part of this inquiry, the forum will need to examine the
validity and enforceability of the clause and possibly grapple with
issues of contractual interpretation. As indicated, the trend now is for

94. Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 2014); see also
Clermont, supra note 23, at 661 (“One could defend this rule by interpreting the forumselection clause as an implicit choice-of-law clause for matters relating to the forumselection clause itself or as the best way to conform to the parties’ expectations.”).
95. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Thus, when the
contract contains a choice-of-law clause, a court can effectuate the parties’ agreement
concerning the forum only if it interprets the forum clause under the chosen law.”);
EnQuip Techs. Grp. v. Tycon Technoglass S.R.I., 986 N.E.2d 469, 479 (Ohio Ct. App.
2012) (“Interpreting [the forum selection clause] under the parties’ chosen law . . .
honors the parties’ agreement . . . .”).
96. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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the forum to apply the chosen law to these latter issues, in part
because that must have been the intention of the parties. What the
parties intended, however, was that the chosen forum would apply the
chosen law.97 They did not necessarily intend that a forum unilaterally
selected by one party (ostensibly in contravention of an exclusive forum
selection clause98) would apply the chosen law. In fact, if one surveyed
the parties on this point, they might actually prefer for a court that is not
nominated in a forum selection clause to apply its own law to issues of
contractual interpretation.99
Third, the parties’ intentions argument appears to be largely an ex
post facto academic justification for applying the chosen law to
interpret forum selection clauses. It is a stretch to believe that the
parties “intended” to have issues of interpretation of forum selection
clauses governed by the chosen law. To say that the parties
“intended” something would imply that the parties considered the
issue and deliberately took steps to memorialize their understanding.
Contracting parties are primarily concerned with memorializing the
key details of their contract.100 Much of the rest is boilerplate. The
parties, or most likely their lawyers, cut and paste some standard
clauses into the contract (a forum selection clause and a choice of law
clause among them) and then hope for the best.101 It is extremely

97. Indirect support for this proposition is found in Professor Coyle’s empirical
study concerning the interpretation of forum selection clauses. He notes that some
survey “respondents who preferred exclusive clauses reported that it was important to
them that the chosen forum and the chosen law be the same and that the only way to
guarantee this outcome was to make the forum selection clause exclusive.” Coyle,
supra note 2, at 1837.
98. I say “ostensibly” because this is often one of the issues that the court will
need to decide—i.e., whether the clause is, in fact, exclusive or non-exclusive.
99. This preference may be revealed by the fact that parties often do not raise the
possibility of the chosen law governing the interpretation of a forum selection clause.
100. Woodward, supra note 71, at 18 (“Moreover, it’s far more likely that the main
features of the contract—the product description, price, and other features—will
attract nearly all of their attention.”).
101. Coyle, supra note 2, at 1794 (“Courts called upon to interpret forum selection
clauses confront a singular challenge—namely, the words and phrases in these
clauses are usually non-negotiated boilerplate. While the contracting parties will
typically dicker over the identity of the chosen forum--whether litigation must
proceed in New York or Texas, for example—they will rarely give much thought to
the other words in their forum selection clause.”); see also Espresso Disposition Corp.
1 v. Santana Sales & Mktg. Grp., 105 So. 3d 592, 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)
(noting that the appellee urged the court not to enforce forum selection clause
based on its error in cutting and pasting the clause from another agreement).
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doubtful that the parties to any contract have ever given any real
thought to the question of what law they would want for a court not
nominated in their contract to use in interpreting the forum selection
clause contained in their contract. The sentiment is aptly articulated
by Professor Coyle:
When the contract language consists of non-negotiated boilerplate,
however, an inquiry into the actual intent of the specific parties to
a particular agreement will rarely turn up useful. The parties are
using the same language as have thousands of other parties in
thousands of other contracts. In such cases, it is difficult for the
courts to credibly maintain that they are giving effect to the intent
of these particular parties to this particular contract. They are
instead assigning a meaning to the language that—they hope—is
broadly in line with what most other parties using that same
language would want it to mean.102

One other point is worth exploring. Above, I have referred to party
intentions as though the parties were on equal terms. In many
contracts, and certainly in consumer contracts, the parties lack equal
bargaining power. Accordingly, the stronger party will dictate the
terms of the contract, including any choice of forum or choice of law
clause.103 As Professor Woodward explains, “any full understanding of
what a choice-of-forum clause means in rational choice terms is likely
to be absent from the vast run of people who receive forms.”104 So, at
least in these sorts of cases, it does not make much sense to talk about
the parties’ intentions, plural. Rather, we are simply talking about
what the intention is of the stronger party, who was able to get the
weaker party to accede to his terms.105 Given all this, it seems that
invoking party intentions as a justification for applying the chosen law
to interpret a forum selection clause is a bit of a stretch. The reality is
the parties intend for the “best” law to govern their forum selection
clause—and the best law for the plaintiff will differ from the best law
for the defendant. The idea that the parties intended something at
the time of contract formation is nothing but fiction.

102. Coyle, supra note 2, at 1794.
103. Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1155.
104. Woodward, supra note 71, at 18.
105. Mo Zhang, Contractual Choice of Law in Contracts of Adhesion and Party
Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 123, 140 (2008) (“With regard to the choice of law
provision in an adhesion contract, the adherent’s signature on the contract by no
means implies that the adherent’s choice is meaningful.”).
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C. The Certainty Argument
Courts and commentators also argue that applying the parties’
chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause promotes certainty
and predictability, two virtues that are particularly important for
contracting parties. Strangely, though, it is hard to pin down the
certainty and predictability arguments with any level of specificity.106
It seems that the certainty and predictability arguments are twofold:
(1) if courts were to apply the chosen law—rather than forum law—
to questions of interpretation, then the result should be the same
regardless of where suit is initiated (“the uniformity argument”); and
(2) given that ultimate questions of contractual interpretation will be
governed by the chosen law, it would seem more consistent to apply
the chosen law to the interpretation of the forum selection clause so
as to avoid any anomalous results (“the consistency argument”). Each
of these rationales suffers from inherent weaknesses.
The uniformity argument essentially posits that “the forumselection clause should have the same interpretation everywhere; we
do not want the clause to mean one thing here and another thing
there.”107 The uniformity argument rests on the unstated assumption
that each court in which litigation could conceivably be filed would
apply the parties’ chosen law to questions of interpretation, and apply
106. For instance, Professor Clermont simply provides a point form list of the
certainty and predictability arguments in favor of applying the parties’ chosen law to
govern forum selection clauses, without much explanation:
[(a)] Applying the chosen law to the forum-selection clause fits the modern
indulgence of party autonomy, and so efficiently facilitates private ordering,
conforms to expectations, and increases certainty; [(b)] Otherwise, the law
will vary with the court selected by the plaintiff, and so the parties will not be
sure what law will apply on the forum-selection clause and, hence, what law
will apply to the rest of the lawsuit; [(c)] The lack of predictability would be
especially detrimental in international commercial contracts.
Clermont, supra note 23, at 656. Professor Yackee equally does not provide much
explanation for how applying the parties’ chosen law promotes certainty. See Yackee,
supra note 40, at 84–85 (“This principle—that the explicitly selected law should
govern the [forum selection agreement]—has multiple advantages over a default
reliance on lex fori. Because most international [business to business] contracts will
contain a choice of law clause, the principle covers most international [forum selection
agreement] disputes. The principle also respects party autonomy and maintains the unity
of the contract by assuring that the same law is applied to different contract
provisions.”); see also Courson, supra note 90, at 597 (“This new autonomy-based
approach is in line with the increasingly party-centered world of transnational trade and
provides foreseeability and certainty in international transactions.”).
107. Clermont, supra note 23, at 661.
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it in the same way. This is an unrealistic assumption. Even within the
United States, it is unlikely that all states would get “on board” with
applying the chosen law to interpretative questions posed by forum
selection clauses. When one considers the myriad of non-U.S. forums
where litigants may initiate disputes, the goal for uniformity through
application of the chosen law becomes a pipe dream.108 But even if all
states were to apply the chosen law to questions of forum selection
clause interpretation, this still would not greatly advance the goal for
predictability and certainty. This is because the chosen law would be
interpreted not by the chosen court, but instead by a court unilaterally
selected by one of the parties. There will certainly be disparities in how a
given court will apply the law of another state or another country to
interpretation issues presented by a forum selection clause.109
The consistency argument is even more attenuated than the
uniformity argument. The argument is basically that we do not want a
word or phrase having one meaning in the context of a forum
selection clause and then a different meaning elsewhere in the
contract.110 Thus, this argument rests on the following factual predicates:
(a) there is a word or phrase used in a forum selection clause that
requires interpretation; (b) that same word or phrase is used somewhere
else in the contract; (c) that word or phrase somewhere else in the
contract also requires interpretation; and (d) that word or phrase
somewhere else in the contract that also requires interpretation would
be interpreted in accordance with the chosen law, which would differ

108. Maxwell J. Wright, Note, Enforcing Forum-Selection Clauses: An Examination of the
Current Disarray of Federal Forum-Selection Clause Jurisprudence and A Proposal for Judicial
Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1625, 1627 (2011) (noting that “whether a clause is
enforceable, and the appropriate procedural mechanisms with which to enforce it, will
depend on the particular federal court in which the suit is filed. Thus, the federal system
completely undermines one of the central purposes of forum-selection clauses—to
provide predictability, stability, and foreseeability to a contractual relationship”).
109. Consider the fact that federal courts applying federal law to questions of the
enforceability of a forum selection clause have reached very different results. See
Borchers, supra note 9, at 101 (“In attempting to apply the Bremen criteria courts
arrived at substantially divergent results. This is problematic because not only does it
produce some unacceptable results, it greatly reduces the value of forum selection
agreements as a tool of economic planning.”).
110. Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 2014) (“If ‘the
interpretation of a forum selection clause [were] singled out for application of any
law other than that chosen to govern the interpretation of the contract as a whole,’
then the same word or phrase could have a different meaning in the forum selection
clause than it has elsewhere in the same contract.” (citation omitted)).
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from how a court interpreted that word or phrase in the forum selection
clause if it used forum law. There are likely very few cases where this
would be an issue. The very unique nature of the potential “problem”
suggests that this should not be used as a justification for applying the
parties’ chosen law to the interpretation question.
D. The Substance/Procedure Argument
Several courts and scholars have relied on the distinction between
substance and procedure to support the practice of applying the parties’
chosen law to questions of forum selection clause interpretation. For
instance, Professor Symeonides argues that “not many people would
question that the interpretation of [forum selection] clauses—like the
interpretation of a contract—is a ‘quintessentially substantive’ question.
Consequently, like any other substantive question, it should not be
answered by the law of the forum qua forum.”111
The substance/procedure divide is not particularly helpful in
advancing the discussion. Professor Symeonides asserts that the
interpretation of forum selection clauses is a “quintessentially substantive”
matter.112 Perhaps it is. But so too is the very validity of a forum selection
clause. What can be more substantive than determining whether or not
a contract (or a clause contained therein) was validly formed?
Professors Roosevelt and Jones, for instance, argue that “[s]ince [a
forum selection clause] is a substantive contractual provision, there is
no obvious reason why its validity should be determined by any law
other than the one that governs the rest of the contract.”113 Despite the
fact that questions of validity appear to be substantive in nature—i.e.,
related to the substance of the parties’ rights and obligations—courts
have repeatedly characterized these questions as procedural.114
Accordingly, courts resort to forum law, not the parties’ chosen law, to
test the validity of forum selection clauses. These courts reason that

111. Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1152.
112. Id.
113. Roosevelt & Jones, supra note 29, at 316.
114. TSI USA, LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-2177-L, 2017 WL 106835, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2017) (citation omitted) (“In Barnett v. DynCorp International,
L.L.C., the Fifth Circuit observed that ‘the “validity” of a forum selection clause is
[arguably] a matter of substantive contract law,’ in which case, courts apply the body
of law dictated by a state law’s choice-of-law rules. But the Court of Appeals also
noted that ‘validity is [arguably] just part of the federal law of enforceability, which
heavily favors forum-selection clauses.’”), aff’d, No. 3:16-CV-2177-L, 2017 WL 3209399
(N.D. Tex. June 19, 2017).
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because such clauses implicate venue, they are considered procedural in
nature.115 This characterization illustrates the inherent malleability of
the substance/procedure dichotomy and explains why some authors have
observed that the “substance-procedure characterization is murky and
unsatisfying within traditional choice of law.”116
The point here is simply that using the substance/procedure
framework to say that issues of validity or enforceability are procedural
(and therefore governed by forum law) and issues of interpretation are
substantive (and therefore governed by chosen law) is not a meaningful
exercise. Both can persuasively be characterized as either substantive or
procedural because of the inherent malleability of these labels.117
E. Miscellaneous Arguments: The “Part of the Contract” Argument and the
Forum Shopping Argument
There are two other arguments that are sometimes advanced in
support of applying the parties’ chosen law: (1) the forum selection
clause is part of the contract and, like all other parts of the contract,
should be interpreted in accordance with the chosen law, and (2) if
courts do not apply the parties’ chosen law, this will encourage forum
shopping. What these two arguments have in common is that they

115. Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628 F.3d 643, 650 (4th Cir. 2010)
(“These cases apply federal common law favoring the enforcement of forum
selection clauses when interpreting contracts that contain forum selection clauses,
because forum selection clauses implicate the appropriate venue of a court. The
appropriate venue of an action is a procedural matter that is governed by federal rule
and statutes. Thus, when a court is analyzing a forum selection clause, which changes
the default venue rules applicable to the agreement, that court will apply federal law
and in doing so, give effect to the parties’ agreement.”) (citation omitted). But see
EnQuip Techs. Grp. v. Tycon Technoglass S.R.I., 986 N.E.2d 469, 476 (Ohio Ct. App.
2012) (“But the conventional application of the substance-procedure dichotomy to
forum-selection matters is problematic. It fails to recognize that the ‘forum-selection
matter’ is composed of at least two discrete, though interrelated, issues, only one of
which is procedural. One issue is how to interpret the forum-selection clause. This is
a substantive issue concerned with what the clause means. The other issue is whether
to enforce the clause. Only this issue is truly procedural because only when a court
enforces a forum-selection clause does the forum change. A court could interpret the
clause and then decide not to enforce it.”).
116. Roosevelt & Jones, supra note 29, at 309.
117. Id. at 315 (“It is not surprising that characterization of forum-selection
clauses is difficult within the conventional Erie framework. From an issue-based,
abstract perspective, forum-selection clauses look procedural: they are about the
conduct of litigation. Yet they are also arguably outcome-determinative: choice of
forum can affect choice of law and hence alter the parties’ substantive rights.”).
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tend to be “throwaway” arguments that appear as an afterthought to
the core rationales for applying the parties’ chosen law.
First, courts reason that “[a] forum-selection clause is part of the
contract. We see no particular reason . . . why a forum-selection
clause . . . should be singled out as a provision not to be interpreted
in accordance with the law chosen by the contracting parties.”118 This
argument once again fails to recognize that forums legitimately apply
forum law to determine the validity and enforceability of various
clauses, including choice of law clauses and forum selection clauses.
If we were to follow the logic above, a court should apply the parties’
chosen law to determine whether a choice of law clause—which is, after
all, part of the contract—is enforceable. Yet, because we recognize that
the forum should have control over certain preliminary matters, we are
comfortable allowing some portions of the contract being governed by
law other than that selected in a choice of law clause.
Second, proponents of applying the parties’ chosen law to
interpret a forum selection clause argue that to do otherwise would
promote forum shopping.119 The argument goes as follows: a party
looking to avoid an exclusive forum selection clause will look for a
forum that interprets such clauses restrictively, such that it will
continue to hear the case notwithstanding the forum selection clause.
Forum shopping is often invoked as a policy rationale for or against a
certain position. The reality is that litigants are always going to forum
shop—because that is what litigants do. Forum shopping is dictated
by a plethora of factors;120 very low on that totem pole of factors is

118. Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428 (10th Cir. 2006).
119. See Yackee, supra note 40, at 83 (listing the potential for forum shopping as
one of the reasons not to apply forum law to determine validity of forum selection
clause); see also Clermont, supra note 23, at 656 (“Applying the chosen law, rather
than lex fori, to the forum-selection clause closes the door to abusive forum
shopping: the plaintiff could be undermining the agreement by choosing a court
that will treat the clauses in a way that favors the plaintiff.”). Note that both of these
authors were referring to the validity of a forum selection clause, though the arguments
apply equally to interpretation questions. See Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 430 (citing Professor
Yackee’s argument about forum shopping to support the argument that the parties’
chosen law should be applied to interpret the forum selection clause).
120. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 345–46 (2006)
(“Forum shopping is not one act or course of conduct but instead encompasses a
variety of factors and choices. This Part describes the five basic, and overlapping,
types of decision making considerations inherent in forum selection: (1) choices
involving federal courts versus state courts; (2) choices involving courts in different
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whether the chosen court would apply forum versus chosen law to
interpret a forum selection clause.
As discussed above, the justifications for applying the parties’ chosen
law to interpret a forum selection clause are not particularly convincing.
And there is a significant downside to using the parties’ chosen law to
interpret forum selection clauses: it is far too complicated at far too early
a stage of litigation. It is to that issue that I now turn.
V. ADDITIONAL REASONS TO NOT APPLY THE CHOSEN LAW
Recall that issues of forum selection and choice of law arise at the
outset of litigation. To require a court to delve into a potentially
complex morass of foreign law in order to decide a threshold issue
that it is fully equipped to answer does not make much sense.121 This
is particularly so given that the court will already be applying forum
law to other preliminary questions, such as the validity and
enforceability of the forum selection clause.122 For the sake of
simplicity—and because there are no powerful arguments to the
contrary—I suggest that interpretation questions presented by a
forum selection clause be governed by forum law. This is especially
important when the chosen law is foreign law, as opposed to the law
of another state. Below, I examine the additional problems and
complications that arise when courts apply the parties’ chosen law to

states; (3) choices involving different substantive laws; (4) choices involving different
procedural provisions; and (5) choices involving subjective and personal factors.”).
121. Surprisingly, Judge Posner writes that “[s]implicity argues for determining
the validity and meaning of a forum selection clause, in a case in which interests
other than those of the parties will not be significantly affected by the choice of
which law is to control, by reference to the law of the jurisdiction whose law governs
the rest of the contract in which the clause appears rather than making the court
apply two different bodies of law in the same case.” Abbott Labs. v. Takeda Pharm.
Co., 476 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). It is hard to understand
how it is simpler to use foreign law (rather than forum law) to decide questions of
validity and interpretation.
122. Fendi S.r.l. v. Condotti Shops, Inc., 754 So. 2d 755, 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (“If we were to adopt [defendant]’s position, Florida courts would be required
to apply the law of the forum to determine the validity of a choice of law clause, while
applying the law of a different jurisdiction to determine the validity of a forum
selection clause. Such a procedure would often result in divergent outcomes and
would require our already overburdened trial courts to engage in the complicated
task of interpreting and applying the law of a foreign jurisdiction.”). Even though the
Fendi court’s statements were made in the context of ascertaining the validity of a
forum selection clause, they apply with equal force to questions of interpretation.
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issues of interpretation, focusing largely on when that chosen law is
the law of another country.
A. What Law Applies?
In a typical choice of law clause, the parties will provide something
to the effect that “any and all disputes arising under this agreement
shall be governed by X law.” The analysis envisioned is that if an
interpretation question arises, such as whether a particular issue is
captured under the moniker of “any and all disputes,” the forum will
turn to X law to decide this threshold issue. If the dispute is
encapsulated within the clause, as determined by the forum applying
the chosen law, then the forum can proceed with the rest of its
analysis.123 But what exactly is X law?
If the parties have selected the law of another U.S. state, then the
analysis should be fairly straightforward. However, if the parties have
chosen the law of a foreign country, particularly a country that is a
signatory to a relevant convention or treaty, problems are likely to
arise right at the outset. A U.S. court will need to decide whether to
apply the chosen forum’s internal law, or its treaty/convention law.
For instance, assume that the parties have chosen Austrian law to
govern their contractual dispute and have nominated Austria as the
exclusive forum for the resolution of all contractual disputes. The
plaintiff sues in New York in contravention of the clause. A New York
court will apply Austrian law to any interpretation questions presented
by the forum selection clause, such as whether a given dispute falls
within the ambit of the clause. But it is unclear what “Austrian law” is: Is
it domestic Austrian law? Or, is it Brussels Regulation law because
Austria is a signatory to the Brussels Regulation?124 Or, is it the Hague

123. For instance, the forum may then determine that because the dispute is
captured under a forum selection clause nominating a different court, the forum
should dismiss the case and thereby “give effect” to the forum selection clause.
124. Recently, the E.U. enacted the Brussels Regulation (recast), which
supplanted the previous version of the Brussels Regulation. Regulation (EU)
1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec. 2012 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (Recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1, https://eur-lex.europa.eu
/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:351:0001:0032:en:PDF [https://perma.
cc/64AU-MTST]. All subsequent references are to the recast Regulation, unless the
context dictates otherwise.
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Choice of Court Convention because Austria is in the European Union
(E.U.), and the European Union has ratified the Convention?125
The sheer complexity of the initial determination of what body of
law to apply is illustrated by Li v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s,
London,126 a recent New York federal case where the parties agreed that
“Swiss Law” applied.127 The parties could not agree, however, “which
particular body of Swiss law applie[d].”128 Initially, the parties agreed
that the Lugano Convention governed questions of interpretation
because Switzerland was a signatory to the Convention.129 However, the
parties disagreed on what specific provisions within the Convention
would be applicable—the provisions dealing with contracts in general,
or the provisions dealing with insurance contracts in particular.130 After
oral argument, the defendants changed course and argued that the
Lugano Convention was not applicable to the dispute.131 Instead, they
argued that the Swiss Private International Law Act of December 18,
125. Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, Hague
Conference on Private International Law, https://assets.hcch.net/docs/510bc2387318-47ed-9ed5-e0972510d98b.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z5B-RWMY]. The Hague
Choice of Court Convention is in force in the E.U., Mexico, and Singapore. The
United States has signed the Convention but has not ratified it. See Status Table 37:
Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HCCH, https://www.hcch.
net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98
[https://perma.cc/VR38329V]. On whether the Brussels Regulation or the Hague Choice of Court
Convention applies, see ALFONSO CODÓN ALAMEDA ET AL., CHOICE OF COURT
AGREEMENTS UNDER BRUSSELS I RECAST REGULATION 5 (2013), http://www.ejtn.eu/
Documents/Themis%20Luxembourg/Written_paper_Spain1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/BUF5-R96V] (“Since Brussels I Recast and the Hague Convention both regulate
jurisdiction in cases regarding agreements conferring jurisdiction, it is necessary to
decide which instrument applies in a given case. This issue is dealt with in Article 26
of the Convention. Brussels I Recast will always be applied if both parties in the
agreement are domiciled in a Member State of the European Union; if one or both
parties to the agreement are domiciled in a State party that is not a EU Member State
the Convention becomes applicable. If the parties are domiciled in a State or in
States that are neither State parties to the Convention nor EU Member States and
the court of a member State is chosen the Recast governs.”).
126. 183 F. Supp. 3d 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
127. Id. at 356–57.
128. Id. at 356.
129. Id.; see Lugano Convention of 30 October 2007 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2007
O.J. (L 339) 3 [hereinafter Lugano Convention], https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22007A1221(03)&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/HF8L-VFQ2].
130. Li, 183 F. Supp. 3d at 356.
131. Id. at 356–57.

2019] FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES MEET CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES 361
1987 and the Swiss Federal Law on Insurance Contracts were the
applicable reference points for Swiss law.132 The parties then
submitted expert affidavits in an effort to assist the court in figuring
out what “Swiss law” was.133 As Li illustrates, interpreting a forum
selection clause in accordance with the parties’ chosen law often
involves the very difficult question of what exactly that law is.
Where there is a patchwork of domestic and treaty law to consider,
the exercise becomes an extremely complicated one. And this exercise is
conducted simply to determine what body of law to apply. After that is
determined, a court must turn to the equally cumbersome task of
deciding what foreign law says on the relevant issues and how to apply
that foreign law to the forum selection clause in question.
The Lugano Convention at issue in Li is the treaty by which certain
European countries, including Switzerland, were brought into the
fold of the Brussels Regulation, the treaty that governs the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the European
Union.134 Accordingly, it is more common in the U.S. case law to see
references to the Brussels Regulation. Many U.S. courts have held that the
Brussels Regulation supplants national law when the parties have chosen
the law of a country that is a signatory to the Brussels Regulation.135
Accordingly, a U.S. court applying the law of an E.U. Member State often
has resort to Brussels Regulation law and not national law.136
132. Id. at 357.
133. Id.
134. Schaller, supra note 50, at 127–28 (“The Lugano Convention is a treaty
between the European Community, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of
Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway, and the Swiss Confederation. Like the Brussels I
Regulation, the Lugano Convention also generally requires the enforcement of
jurisdiction clauses between parties to the convention.”).
135. Note that whether a U.S. court should apply internal foreign law or Brussels
Regulation law is often hotly contested. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reargument Of The
Court’s Memorandum Opinion Decided May 23, 2019 at 8, Germaninvestments AG
v. Allomet Corp., No. 2018-0666-JRS, 2019 WL 2404888 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019)
(“Under Professor Doctor Czernich’s analysis obtained to analyze the Opinion, no
Defendant is a citizen of an EU member state and this Court is not in an EU member
state. Thus, under Article 6 of the Brussels Regulation, the determination of whether
the ‘parties intended otherwise’ regarding the exclusive or permissive nature of
Section 9 of the R&L Agreement for purposes of Article 25 of the Brussels
Regulation will be determined by domestic Austrian law . . . .”).
136. The analysis is actually even more complicated, since there are four private
international law instruments operating within the E.U.: the Brussels Regulation, the
Rome I Regulation, the Lugano Convention, and the Hague Choice of Court
Agreement. See Schaller, supra note 50, at 129–30; see also ALAMEDA, supra note 125, at
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The analysis, though, is more than a little awkward since U.S.
courts are essentially applying a treaty in the abstract. The Brussels
Regulation ordinarily applies only if the defendant in an action is
domiciled in a Member State.137 There is an exception, however, for
jurisdiction agreements: if parties to an action designate a Member
State to hear their dispute, the courts of that Member State will have
jurisdiction and any resultant judgment will be enforceable across all
Member States.138 The jurisdiction agreement is presumed to be
exclusive.139 The key, though, is that the Brussels Regulation only “kicks
in” if the courts of a Member State are chosen as the forum for the
resolution of disputes and proceedings are before the courts of that
Member State or another Member State.140 The Regulation has no
application outside of this context. Simply choosing a Member State’s
“law” does not mean that the Brussels Regulation applies.141

3 (“Brussels I Recast, the Hague Convention on Choice of Forum Agreements, the
Lugano 2007 Convention and also domestic rules govern choice-of-court agreements
in civil and commercial matters. [An E.U.] Judge that is served with a claim
regarding a forum clause is bound by all these instruments. Therefore, the first issue
is to decide which instrument applies.”).
137. Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
Dec. 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (Recast), art. 4, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 7; Schaller, supra note 50, at 128.
138. The Brussels Regulation (recast) significantly expands the scope of the
Regulation. See Sarah Garvey, Brussels Regulation (Recast): Are You Ready?, ALLEN &
OVERY: PUBLICATIONS (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/engb/Pages/BRUSSELS-REGULATION-(RECAST)-ARE-YOU-READY.aspx [https://
perma.cc/FSN7-FEVB] (“Perhaps the most significant change here is that the domicile
requirement for parties to an Article 25 jurisdiction agreement has been dropped, so a
jurisdiction clause will fall within the scope of Article 25 even if none of the parties are
domiciled in a member state. This change has significantly expanded the scope of those
jurisdiction agreements captured by the Brussels regime.”).
139. Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 provides, in relevant part:
If the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the
courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which
have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal
relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction, unless the
agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that
Member State. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have
agreed otherwise.
Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, art. 25, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 11.
140. Id.
141. There is a more compelling case for application of the Brussels Regulation
when the parties choose a Member State as the exclusive forum for dispute
resolution, along with the law of that Member State. And, in fact, it is customary for a
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Even if the Brussels Regulation could be said to apply when the
parties choose the law of a Member State,142 there is the added wrinkle
of what is covered by Brussels Regulation law and what is covered by
national law. Issues related to whether a clause is mandatory or
permissive are said to be governed by Brussels Regulation law.143
Accordingly, a U.S. court would have resort to European law on this
particular question.144 Thus, a U.S. court would look at jurisprudence
from the European Court of Justice and domestic courts of Member
States interpreting the Brussels Regulation.145 Issues of scope, on the
other hand, are left to national law. Professor Merrett emphasizes that
“it is clear that national law still has an important role to play in the
operation of Article 23 [now Article 25 of the Brussels Regulation]
because questions as to interpretation, and therefore the scope of the
jurisdiction agreement, remain a question of national law, namely the
applicable law.”146 So, even if a U.S. court were to apply Brussels
Regulation law to certain interpretation questions, such as whether a
clause is mandatory or permissive, the court would still have to apply the
internal law of the Member State to other interpretation questions.147
forum selection clause and choice of law clause to match up. However, courts have not
clearly articulated this as the basis for concluding that the Brussels Regulation applies.
142. Some parties and courts fail to recognize the potential applicability of the
Brussels Regulation. See, e.g., Trade Wind Distribution, LLC v. Unilux AG, No. 10
CIV. 5716 (BMC), 2011 WL 4382986, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2011) (using domestic
German law to determine whether forum selection clause provided for exclusive
jurisdiction in Germany).
143. Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn plc v. Petereit, 1992 E.C.R. I-1745.
144. But see Perella Weinberg Partners UK LLP v. Codere SA [2016] EWHC (Comm)
1182 [9], [23] (Eng.) (Brussels Regulation case but English court applied English
principles of construction to determine whether clause was exclusive or non-exclusive).
145. See Li v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 183 F. Supp. 3d 348, 357–58
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (defendant references a European Court of Justice case where the
court was interpreting the Brussels Regulation); IDV N. Am., Inc. v. Saronno, No. CV
99058059, 1999 WL 773961, at *13, *18 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 1999) (parties
referencing Italian jurisprudence to interpret the Brussels Regulation and the court
rejecting Italian courts’ interpretation of the Brussels Regulation); Germaninvestments
AG v. Allomet Corp., No. 2018-0666-JRS, 2019 WL 2236844, at *7–9 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2019) (Delaware court utilizing Austrian jurisprudence to interpret the Brussels
Regulation).
146. Louise Merrett, Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation: A Comprehensive Code for
Jurisdiction Agreements?, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 546–47 (2009).
147. Powell Duffryn, 1992 E.C.R. I-1745; see also Skype Techs. SA v. Joltid Ltd [2009]
EWHC (Ch) 2783, [2011] I.L.Pr. [103], [110] (Eng.) (“Whether a claim falls within
an agreed jurisdiction clause is a question of interpretation of the clause in question.
That question is to be decided according to national law, even in the context of the
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This would mean that a U.S. court would apply forum law to the validity
and enforceability of a forum selection clause, Brussels Regulation
(European) law to whether the clause is mandatory or permissive, and
domestic Member State law to other interpretation questions.
As if that were not enough, there are also renvoi-type issues to
consider.148 The doctrine of renvoi recognizes that when parties
chose the “law” of some state, that law necessarily encompasses a
state’s choice of law rules. Those choice of law rules might in turn,
point toward applying some other body of law.149 In other words,
when the parties choose a state’s law, they may intend for a court to
apply that state’s whole law, including its conflict of laws rules.150 In

Judgments Regulation.” (citing Case C-269/95, Benincasa v. Dentalkit Srl [1997]
E.T.M.R. 447; Knorr-Bremse Sys. for Commercial Vehicles Ltd. v. Haldex Brake
Prods. GmbH [2008] EWHC (Pat) 156, [2008] F.S.R. 30)).
148. Arguably, choosing whether to use domestic law or treaty law is, itself, a
renvoi issue. U.S. courts tend not to engage in a renvoi analysis, perhaps because the
Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws’ position is that a choice of law clause should
ordinarily be interpreted to refer to a foreign forum’s internal law. With that said,
the renvoi issue has occasionally creeped up in the case law. For instance, in CeramiKote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 733 P.2d 1143 (Idaho 1989), the parties had provided
that their contract would be “interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of the
state of Florida.” Id. at 1145. The court concluded that “the district court technically
should have applied Florida law expressly to determine the validity of the forum
selection clause in the contract . . . . The question then becomes how the Florida
courts regard the enforceability of forum selection clauses.” Id. at 1145–46. The court
then determined that Florida courts would not enforce a forum selection clause that
violated a strong public policy of the forum from which the suit had been excluded,
in this case, Idaho. Id. at 1146. Accordingly, the Idaho court essentially looked to do
what the Florida court would do—and the Florida court would look to whether the
action would violate the public policy of Idaho. Id. at 1147. Although the renvoi issue
arose in the unusual context of the enforceability of a forum selection clause, it
shows that the analysis into the law that governs the forum selection clause is much
more complicated than appears at first blush.
149. Renvoi is “[t]he problem arising when one state’s rule on conflict of laws
refers a case to the law of another state, and that second state’s conflict-of-law rule
refers the case either back to the law of the first state or to a third state.” Renvoi,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
150. U.S. courts are generally not fans of renvoi. See Courson, supra note 90, at 626
(“Not surprisingly, various conflict of laws schemes set limits on the applicability of
conflict of laws rules of a State other than those of the seized court. For example, the
[Restatement] . . . addresses circumstances where a forum’s conflict of laws rules
requires the application of ‘the law’ of another state. Here, subject to two exceptions,
the Restatement counsels courts to apply the ‘local law’ of the other state. ‘Local law’
as used in the Restatement refers to the law of a state exclusive of that state’s choice
of law rules.” (footnotes omitted)).
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short, the goal of renvoi is for the forum to replicate what the chosen
law would do in the circumstances.151 Because renvoi is conceptually
amorphous, it is helpful to view the issue in more concrete terms.
Assume that the parties have chosen “English law” to govern all
contractual disputes. A U.S. court could apply internal English law to the
interpretation questions presented by the forum selection clause.152 That
is, a U.S. court would look to how English courts interpret the
ambiguous words and phrases contained in the forum selection clause
at issue. This would involve no renvoi and is clearly the simplest
solution. However, there is another possibility—in applying English
law to interpret the forum selection clause, a U.S. court could apply
England’s whole law, including its choice of law rules. This involves
the question of renvoi. In this scenario the U.S. court would ask,
“What would England do if presented with the interpretation of a
forum selection clause?” and seek to mirror that result.153 In the
above example, it could be that England regards the interpretation
question as procedural and therefore governed by forum law. If
English law applies forum law to the question of interpretation, then
arguably, there is a case for “remission”—metaphorically sending the
case “back” to be governed by U.S. law.154

151. Id. at 624–25 (“The fact that a forum may have different sets of law applicable
to [a forum selection agreement] analysis raises perhaps the most complex issue . . . .
Which of the chosen forum’s laws should apply and which, if any, should be
excluded? Should courts look only to the domestic law of the chosen forum or
should they also consider the private international law of the chosen forum? The
latter question puts courts in the unenviable position of considering the ‘Sphinx-like’
question of renvoi.” (footnotes omitted)).
152. For the purpose of this hypothetical, I am ignoring the potential applicability
of the Brussels Regulation. The English government has published a draft statutory
instrument addressing the question of how the UK courts will treat questions of
jurisdiction and judgment enforcement involving E.U. Member States post-Brexit. See
generally The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations
2019, SI 2019/479 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/479/made
?view=plain [https://perma.cc/ECF6-B2KQ].
153. Professor Clermont argues that U.S. courts should apply a foreign forum’s
whole law, including its conflicts rules. He asserts that “[w]henever one looks to
foreign law on interpreting a forum-selection clause, one is looking for how the
foreign court would read it. One must unearth which law the foreign court would
actually apply to the forum-selection clause. Then all courts can reach the same
result.” Clermont, supra note 23, at 662.
154. This is not a typical renvoi problem. Renvoi problems usually result when the
chosen law would apply some other body of law because its choice of law rules point
in that direction. This is different than the scenario presented above because the
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There is another renvoi-type issue that is worth considering. What
happens if the chosen law would deem the forum selection clause to
be invalid?155 For instance, assume that English law invalidates all
forum selection clauses in consumer contracts. The parties enter into
a consumer contract containing an English forum selection clause
and an English choice of law clause. One party sues in the United
States in contravention of the clause. A U.S. court applying English
law to questions of interpretation would be engaging in a completely
irrational analysis. If English law would invalidate the forum selection
clause in the consumer contract, it would never have occasion to
interpret it. By bifurcating the analysis, such that validity is governed
by forum law and interpretation is governed by the chosen law, a U.S.
court may be interpreting something that an English court would
never interpret. Thus, the exercise is entirely artificial.
This Section illustrates that even identifying “what law” to apply is a
highly complex endeavor. Courts and parties struggle when determining
whether to apply domestic law or treaty law to the interpretation of a
forum selection clause. And even if domestic law does apply, there are
further renvoi-type complications. All of this militates against applying

scenario above would essentially re-characterize the issue according to the chosen law.
That is, because England might view interpretation as a procedural matter or a
matter of validity, it would apply forum law (and not the chosen law) to the matter.
Professor Roosevelt notes that “[t]he easiest way to create a renvoi is through a
difference in two states’ choice-of-law rules.” Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi:
The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821,
1828–30 (2005). However, renvoi problems can also arise where courts “characterize
a cause of action differently.” Id. at 1829. He notes:
If one state’s courts see the case as presenting a tort issue, and the other
state’s courts as a contract action, they may again each conclude that the
other state’s law applies. Likewise, disagreement over the classification of an
issue as substantive or procedural can have the same effects, since courts will
follow local procedure even when applying foreign substantive law.
Id. at 1829–30 (footnotes omitted).
155. This is not technically a renvoi issue. However, a similar issue was raised by
Professor Davies in relation to the leading Australian case on renvoi. See Martin
Davies, Note, Nelson v. Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd: Renvoi and
Presumptions about Foreign Law, 30 MELB. U. L. REV. 244, 256 (2006) (“If, for whatever
reason, the foreign court would not have or retain jurisdiction according to its own
rules . . . what should the Australian court do? The answer seems simple, if perhaps rather
shocking to conflict of laws scholars: the court should apply Australian law, the lex fori.
What other alternative is there? To apply Chinese law to a case that would not even be
heard by a Chinese court seems even more perverse than to apply Chinese law to a case
that a Chinese court would consider to be governed by non-Chinese law.”).
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the parties’ chosen law to interpretation questions and instead
viewing the interpretation exercise as intertwined with the
determination of a clause’s validity and enforceability, calling for an
application of forum law.
B. What Happens When No Law is Chosen?
Using the parties’ chosen law to interpret forum selection clauses
leads to an analytical disconnect between contracts with choice of law
clauses and contracts without choice of law clauses. There seems to
be agreement among scholars that if interpretation issues are to be
governed by the parties’ chosen law, then the same approach should
follow when the parties have not chosen a governing law.156 In other
words, if we are to accept that the law governing the contract applies
to interpretation questions presented by a forum selection clause,
then the principle applies equally whether or not the parties have
chosen the governing law. Accordingly, in the absence of a choice of
law clause, courts should first ascertain what the governing law of the
contract would be—through a formal conflicts analysis—and then
apply that law to issues of forum selection clause interpretation.
For instance, assume that the parties have agreed “to adjudicate all
disputes in the courts of Italy.” They have not, however, designated a
governing law. As is typical, one of the parties files suit in a forum
other than Italy (say, Delaware). A Delaware court should determine
what law governs the underlying contract by reference to its domestic
choice of law rules.157 This analysis would lead a Delaware court to
some body of law—perhaps Italian law, perhaps Delaware law,
perhaps some other body of law. Whatever body of law governs the
contract would be used to interpret the forum selection clause. This
is the most theoretically sound result, such that all forum selection
clauses would be governed by the law otherwise applicable to the
contract at issue, whether or not they contain a choice of law clause.
As recognized by the Fifth Circuit, “the presence or absence of a
specific choice-of-law clause does not alter the core obligation of a
federal court, sitting in diversity, to ascertain which body of
substantive law to apply by implementing the choice-of-law rules of its

156. Clermont, supra note 23, at 661 (“The law of the chosen court should
normally govern interpretation of the forum-selection clause even in the absence of a
choice-of-law clause.”).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 188 (Am. Law Inst. 1971).
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home jurisdiction.”158 The problem is that most courts simply do not
engage in this sort of analysis159—and it is unlikely that they will
anytime soon.160 Why?
It may be that courts and parties do not even have it on their
horizon that some law other than forum law could govern the
interpretation of a forum selection clause. Since issues of validity,
enforceability, and interpretation tend to mesh together, litigants
and judges may uncritically assume that forum law is the appropriate
reference point. This is particularly so in cases without an explicit
choice of law clause to remind courts and parties that a choice of law
inquiry needs to be undertaken. Alternatively, even if parties are
aware of the issue, they may choose not to raise choice of law for one
reason or another. A party may decide that it is not worth the time or
expense of injecting choice of law issues into the calculus. Or, a party
may realize that it would fare worse if a U.S. court used the law
dictated by a choice of law analysis in the interpretation exercise. The
bottom line is that courts and litigants treat contracts containing
explicit choice of law clauses differently than contracts not
containing choice of law clauses when it comes to interpreting a
forum selection clause.161 This leads to a conceptual disconnect
between cases involving choice of law clauses and those not involving
choice of law clauses.

158. Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 770–71 (5th Cir. 2016).
159. Buxbaum, supra note 22, at 149 (“In interpreting forum selection clauses
when the contract in question does not include a choice of law, courts are even more
likely simply to apply forum law to questions of interpretation. Relatively few will go
through the process of applying the forum’s choice of law rules in an effort to
identify the law governing the contract. Some courts justify this approach by
concluding that the choice of court was implicitly also a choice of the forum’s law.
Other courts may simply be avoiding complicated conflicts analysis.”).
160. But see Weber, 811 F.3d at 769 (“First, we review the record to determine the
best possible English-language rendering of the German-language [forum selection
clause]. Second, we apply Texas choice-of-law rules to determine which substantive law governs the
interpretation of the [forum selection clause]. Third, we apply that substantive law to the
language of the [forum selection clause] to decide whether it is mandatory or permissive.
We conclude that this [forum selection clause] is mandatory.” (emphasis added)).
161. One other reason why courts might avoid the choice of law exercise in the
absence of a clause is that the process for ascertaining the governing law is “laborious
[and] indeterminate.” Symeonides, supra note 1, at 1135.
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C. The Principle of Party Prosecution
Things become even more convoluted when one considers that
issues of pleading and proof of foreign law are generally subject to
party prosecution. If the parties do not raise the possibility of the
chosen law applying to interpret a forum selection clause, a court will
usually decide any interpretation issues in accordance with forum
law.162 In the words of one court:
Courts may be justified in pretermitting this analysis when neither
party contends that any distinctive feature of the relevant
substantive law decides the dispute. And indeed, parties’ failure to
brief choice-of-law analysis or arguments about distinctive features
of foreign law seems to have driven many courts to default to
general contract principles, even when they recognize that either
ordinary choice-of-law rules or a valid choice-of-law clause would, in
principle, dictate application of foreign law.163

Parties often fail to raise or brief the issue that the parties’ chosen
law may govern the interpretation of the forum selection clause, so it
is common to see courts resorting to forum law despite the presence
of a choice of law clause.164 In many cases, parties raise the possibility
162. Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 99 (3d Cir. 2018)
(treating failure to raise the issue of foreign law as waiver).
163. Weber, 811 F.3d at 771.
164. See, e.g., Glob. Seafood Inc. v. Bantry Bay Mussels Ltd., 659 F.3d 221, 224–25
n.3 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We note that we are not applying Irish law to our analysis of the
forum selection clause, despite the Heads of Agreement’s choice of law provision
designating the agreement is to be ‘governed by Irish Law.’ Although choice of law
provisions are generally applied when determining whether a forum selection clause
is mandatory or permissive under step two of the Phillips analysis, because neither
party has presented any evidence regarding how Irish law would interpret the
provision at issue in this case, and because neither party has objected on appeal to
the district court’s reliance on federal law to resolve this issue below, we will ‘apply
general contract law principles and federal precedent to discern the meaning and
scope of the forum clause.’” (citing Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 385–
86 (2d Cir. 2007))); Rosehoff Ltd. v. Cataclean Ams. LLC, No. 12-CV-1143A, 2013
WL 2389725, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. May 30, 2013) (“Section 19 of the Licensing Agreement
contains language that British law will govern ‘every particular’ of the agreement,
‘including formation and interpretation.’ This language, on its face, would appear to
mean that the Court has to use procedural British law even to assess whether the
parties’ dispute should go to a British court for determination under substantive
British law . . . . Nonetheless, the parties have not cited any provision of British law at
any time in the history of this case. In its request for supplemental briefing, the Court
indirectly gave the parties one more opportunity to cite British law when addressing
whether a British court could have jurisdiction to enforce violations of federal trademark
and patent law by agreement of the parties. The supplemental briefing again contains
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of the chosen law governing the interpretation of the forum selection
clause, then proceed to cite exclusively to federal law on the issue.165
Sometimes parties choose to rely on foreign law for some interpretation
issues, and forum law for others.166 In some cases, it seems like the
parties are not really clear on what law they even want to apply.167
Given the principle of party prosecution, there is a patchwork
approach to the question of what law a court will apply to interpret a
forum selection clause. Variables that will go into the mix include
whether the parties have explicitly chosen a governing law, whether
the parties have raised the choice of law issue, and whether the court
independently decides to apply chosen law to interpretation issues.
The different approaches can be summarized as follows:

only citations to U.S. federal law. Since the parties appear not to object to using federal
law for the limited purpose of assessing the enforceability of the forum selection clause,
the Court’s substantive analysis below will proceed in that way.”).
165. AdvanceMe, Inc. v. Le Magnifique, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-02175-RWS, 2014 WL
61526, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 8, 2014) (arguing that the court “must interpret the
forum selection clause under New York law pursuant to the New York choice of law
provision” but then “cit[ing] only federal cases from the Second Circuit that apply
federal law”); Hunnicutt v. CHF Sols., Inc., No. 10-CV-0042-CVE-FHM, 2010 WL
1078470, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 18, 2010) (arguing that Minnesota law applies
because the agreement contains a Minnesota choice of law provision, and then citing
exclusively to federal law, not Minnesota law).
166. See Ujvari v. 1stdibs.com, Inc., No. 16 CIV. 2216 (PGG), 2017 WL 4082309, at
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2017).
167. For instance, in Robatech Midwest, Inc. v. Leuthner, the court observed:
Interestingly, the defendants seem to primarily cite Georgia substantive law for
contract interpretation, despite the fact that it hurts their forum-selection
argument to read the parties’ forum selection clause as prescribing Georgia law
as the controlling law. The plaintiff, meanwhile, cites everything from Illinois to
New Jersey to Wisconsin substantive law (among others, as interpreted by both
state and federal courts), but never Georgia substantive law, in spite of the fact
that it would help the plaintiff’s argument that the clause in question is not a
forum-selection clause but actually a choice-of-law clause.
Robatech Midwest, Inc. v. Leuthner, No. 14-CV-1230-JPS, 2015 WL 1219642, at *4 n.5
(E.D. Wis. Mar. 17, 2015) (citation omitted).
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Variable

Possible Results

No choice of law clause

Court conducts choice of law inquiry
and applies governing law or court
applies forum law.

Choice of Law Clause
(raised by parties)

Court will usually apply the chosen
law; some courts apply forum law.

Choice of Law Clause
(not raised by parties)

Court will usually apply forum law;
some courts will apply chosen law.

Thus, even if one accepted the premise that the parties’ chosen law
(or the law directed by a choice of law analysis) should apply to
interpretation questions, actually having a court apply that law is far
from certain. Because of the principle of party prosecution, the
ability of a court to control the litigation before it, and obscurity of
the choice of law issue in the absence of an explicit clause, any
certainty and uniformity arguments in support of having the chosen
law govern interpretation are significantly undermined.
D. The Complications of Foreign Law
There are numerous challenges presented by introducing foreign
law into a U.S. case.168 The issue is no different when endeavoring to
ascertain and apply foreign law to interpret a forum selection clause.
First, there are translation difficulties. If the foreign law is in a foreign
language, it will need to be translated into English for U.S. courts to
work with. This translation exercise is fraught with difficulties since
translated words often do not carry the same connotation in English

168. See Peter Hay, The Use and Determination of Foreign Law in Civil Litigation in the
United States, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 213, 213–15 (2014) for a general overview of the use
of foreign law in U.S. courts. See also Roger M. Michalski, Pleading and Proving Foreign
Law in the Age of Plausibility Pleading, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1207, 1245–48 (2011)
(explaining the practical problems U.S. courts encounter when simply determining
what foreign law to apply and how to apply it); Matthew J. Wilson, Improving the
Process: Transnational Litigation and the Application of Private Foreign Law in U.S. Courts,
45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1111, 1121 (2013) (laying out the problems U.S. judges
face in applying foreign law, which include: a general unfamiliarity with foreign laws
and their concepts; a lack of training in applying foreign law; administrative
demands that drain time and energy; and a general “lack of resources and disparities
in language, legal practice, and the different role of judges in foreign countries”).
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as in the original language.169 Additionally, parties may not even
agree on what the appropriate translation of foreign law is.170
Second, law does not exist in a vacuum and cannot be plucked
wholesale from the system from which it originates. A U.S. court
cannot simply excise certain words and phrases from a foreign statute
or a case without appreciating the backdrop against which the
foreign law operates.171 Accordingly, U.S. courts must examine
foreign law in context—a context they may not be familiar with.
Third, U.S. courts face problems related to proof of foreign law.
Typically, courts rely on parties to present them with the content of
foreign law. This is usually effectuated by parties presenting expert
affidavits from lawyers or academics who are specialists in foreign law.
The complexity of the battle of the experts cannot be overstated. In
TH Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Group Ltd.,172 for
instance, the parties submitted affidavits from six different experts on
Dutch law. Several of these declarations were in excess of twenty
pages.173 The experts’ opinions conflicted as to whether the forum
selection clause at issue was exclusive or non-exclusive under Dutch
law. The court seemed to throw up its hands, emphasizing that the
court “is not nor does it purport to be an expert in the law of The
Netherlands.”174 The court then rested on the plaintiff’s inability to
rebut the presumption that a forum selection clause is ordinarily
considered exclusive under the Brussels Regulation.175 The court
made no effort to grapple with the (presumably) hundreds of pages

169. See Thomas O. Main, The Word Commons and Foreign Laws, 46 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 219, 230–31 (2013) (“Language is famously indeterminate. Even within a single
discourse community, one word can have multiple meanings. Multiple words can share
one meaning. The meaning of words can change over time. New ideas and concepts
spawn new words. And ambiguity, vagueness, and generality are de rigueur. Accordingly,
the study of meaning can be the study of something ephemeral, elusive, and enigmatic.”).
170. Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 576 F.3d 1166, 1171 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that
parties submitted competing translations of the relevant Swiss law).
171. Hay, supra note 168, at 221–22 (“American judges view foreign law through
an American lens . . . . For example, the premise that judicial opinions serve the
same function in the French legal system as they do in the American legal system is
false.” (quoting Philip D. Stacey, Rule 44.1, Bodum USA v. La Cafetiere, and the
Challenge of Determining Foreign Law, 6 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 472, 494–95 (2011))).
172. 416 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1079 (D. Kan. 2006), aff’d, 488 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir.
2007).
173. See id. at 1078.
174. Id. at 1079.
175. Id.
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of expert testimony before it. Similarly, in Sberbank of Russia v.
Traisman,176 the court was presented with conflicting expert affidavits
on Russian law. Again, rather than engage with Russian law, the court
simply seemed to side with one of the experts because of “his
credentials as a scholar of Russian law and his citation to Russian
legal authority that supports his opinion.”177
In addition to wading through the morass of expert affidavits, the
court must consider that these “experts” are in fact hired guns.178 As
aptly stated by Judge Posner in arguably the leading case on the use
of foreign law in U.S. courts, Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc.:
Lawyers who testify to the meaning of foreign law, whether they are
practitioners or professors, are paid for their testimony and
selected on the basis of the convergence of their views with the
litigating position of the client, or their willingness to fall in with
the views urged upon them by the client. These are the banes of
expert testimony.179

In the same case, Judge Easterbrook emphasized that proving
foreign law through experts “adds an adversary’s spin, which the
court must then discount.”180
Finally, interjecting foreign law into a case dramatically increases
the cost and complexity for the parties and the court. Parties need to
hire foreign law experts, who certainly do not come cheap. One
commentator explains:
Finding a capable, credible expert remains a huge challenge for
litigants. As one scholar from the print era noted: “they are not
listed in the yellow pages.” And in the Internet age, despite a
plethora of claims of expertise online, few people have what it takes
to empower a judge to comfortably construe foreign law. The best
experts will perform a “‘double process of translation’” wherein
they analyze terms and concepts embedded within the culture of
the foreign legal system and then explain those terms and concepts

176. No. 3:14cv216 (WWE), 2014 WL 10999674, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 14, 2014).
177. Id.
178. See Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S.
Courts: Opening the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887,
891 (2011) (discussing various issues that arise when courts rely on the adversarial
process to produce expert testimony on foreign law, such as litigants who attempt to
“‘muddy the waters’ by painting an overly complicated picture of foreign law, even if
the law is simple and fairly straightforward”).
179. Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Posner, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 629 (majority opinion).
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within the context of the U.S. legal framework. Needless to say, this
process requires fluency in both the foreign legal system and the
U.S. legal system plus impeccable language and communication
skills. Many litigants will not be able to afford the substantial costs
involved with identifying and hiring a foreign law expert.181

Not only is this a costly and complicated endeavor for litigants, but
it is also burdensome for courts. When faced with issues of foreign
law, courts need to devote more time and institutional resources to
sorting out these issues than they would simply applying forum law to
interpretation issues.182 And, it bears repeating that all these foreign
law complications arise before a case even begins.
E. Interpretation in Practice: Courts Do Not Do a Good Job Applying the
Chosen Law
That courts should not apply the parties’ chosen law to interpret a
forum selection clause is plainly evident in the cases themselves.
Below, I make five observations about how courts are faring in using
the parties’ chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause. As noted
above, the cases here focus exclusively on courts’ using foreign law
when it is chosen by the parties.
1.

Problem One: Courts are “all over the place” in their analysis
Many courts do not seem to be on solid footing when it comes to
applying the parties’ chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause.
Accordingly, the analysis is all over the place, mixing forum and
foreign law as though it were interchangeable. A prime example of
this free-flowing approach to interpretation is EnQuip Technologies
Group v. Tycon Technoglass S.R.I.183 In EnQuip, the American plaintiff
sued the Italian defendant in Ohio.184 The parties’ contract contained
a forum selection clause in favor of Italy, and a choice of law clause
providing that all disputes would be governed by Italian law.185 The

181. Loren Turner, Buried Treasure: Excavating Foreign Law from Civil Pleadings Filed
in U.S. Federal Courts, 47 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 22, 40–41 (2019) (footnote omitted).
182. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (“A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign
country’s law must give notice by a pleading or other writing. In determining foreign
law, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether
or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
court’s determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.”).
183. 986 N.E.2d 469, 474 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).
184. Id. at 472–73.
185. Id. at 473.
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court determined that Italian law should govern the interpretation of
the forum selection clause, and in particular, the question of whether
the provision “the law Court of Venice will be competent for any
dispute” was a mandatory or permissive forum selection clause.186
The court inexplicably started off its analysis by applying Ohio
(forum) interpretative principles to the dispute. The court cited to
Ohio law for the proposition that language in a contract bears the
meaning intended by the parties to the contract.187 The court also
referred generally to Ohio principles of contractual interpretation,
such as the rule that a contract must be read as a whole and that
meaning must be determined contextually.188 Following this, the
court explored Ohio principles governing the distinction between
mandatory and permissive jurisdiction clauses.189 After this extensive
recitation of Ohio law and much more meandering through Ohio
and federal case law, the court finally turned to Italian law, which it
had said at the outset would apply to the question of interpretation.190
The Ohio court determined that because Italy was a signatory to
the Brussels Regulation, that legal instrument governed whether the
impugned clause was mandatory or permissive.191 Beyond that, the court
engaged in very little meaningful analysis. It quoted the relevant provision
of the Brussels Regulation—that if parties agree that a particular court is
“to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may
arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court . . . shall
have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties
have agreed otherwise.”192 The court made no effort to determine
whether the parties had “agreed otherwise.” It cited only three Italian
cases in its entire judgment. The extent of its analysis of Italian law
was largely as follows:
Italy’s highest court . . . has held that a forum-selection clause in
which the parties agree that ‘‘the competent court for any possible
dispute is the court of the initiating party” conferred exclusive
jurisdiction on that court. The Court of Genoa has said that it is

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 474, 480.
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 476–80.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 481.
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not necessary for the clause to expressly refer to the identified
court’s exclusivity.193

The Ohio court provided no elaboration beyond the one quote.
The court then abruptly turned to English law, reasoning that
England is also a signatory to the Brussels Regulation.194 However, the
Ohio court did not actually look to English law on the matter, but
rather a U.S. federal court’s interpretation of what English law was.195
In short, the mix of Ohio, federal, Italian, and English law was a
mess. It was impossible to glean what the court was doing at any given
moment. This mish-mash is fairly typical of how courts approach the
interpretation exercise when it involves applying the parties’ chosen
law, particularly when that law is foreign law.196
2. Problem Two: Courts rely on other U.S. courts’ interpretation of foreign
law
A major problem with many of the cases that apply the parties’ chosen
law to issues of interpretation is that they rely on a U.S. court’s
interpretation of the chosen law, not the chosen law itself. That is, instead
of canvassing and analyzing legal authority from the actual chosen law,
many courts simply rely on what other U.S. courts say this law is.197
Amto, LLC v. Bedford Asset Management, LLC198 is emblematic of the
approach that courts seem to be taking. In Amto, the Southern District of
New York decided to apply the parties’ chosen law, English law, to
decide the forum selection clause’s scope.199 Instead of actually looking
at English law, the court looked at “[t]wo recent cases from the Second
Circuit [that] provide a helpful exploration of English law on the subject

193. Id. at 480 (citation omitted). The court looked to Italian law for a throwaway
proposition, as well. Id. at 481 (“Italy’s highest court has said that because Article 23
is ‘substantially analogous’ to Article 17 the interpretation of Article 23 must be
based on Article 17. Saneco S.A. v. Toscoline S.r.l. (2006).”).
194. Id. at 481.
195. Id.
196. Schaller, supra note 50, at 181 n.334 (“[T]he court states [that] the chosen
foreign law should be applied to interpretation issues but then cites and discusses only U.S.
cases in discussing interpretation issues and thus does not really ‘apply’ the foreign law.”).
197. Turner, supra note 181, at 46 (noting that U.S. courts’ interpretations of
foreign law may provide a “jumping off point” but that “it doesn’t guarantee accuracy
of the content of foreign law”).
198. 168 F. Supp. 3d 556, 565–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
199. Id. at 564.
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of the scope of forum selection clauses.”200 After a detailed recitation of
what these two New York cases said English law was, the court concluded
that the defendant’s “defenses, counterclaims, and third-party claims are
much more akin to the claims in [U.S. Case 1] than the claims
in [U.S. Case 2].”201 Similarly, in Laspata DeCaro Studio Corp. v. Rimowa
GmbH,202 the court purportedly interpreted the forum selection clause’s
language in accordance with German law without citing one German
case. Instead, it noted that “[American] courts applying German law
have held similar language to be mandatory.”203 It then cited to three
U.S. cases that interpreted similar language applying German law.204
The approach that U.S. courts use to foreign law in this context is
reminiscent of the children’s game commonly known as “Broken
Telephone.”205 The game involves one child whispering something to the
next child and that child whispering it to the next. By the end of the
“telephone line,” what was originally said has completely morphed into
something else. The same is true here. One court pronounces what “X
law” is, and other courts keep repeating it until the law becomes
something it is not.
3. Problem Three: Courts generally do not engage in meaningful analysis of
foreign law
In most cases involving U.S. courts applying the parties’ chosen law to
questions of forum selection clause interpretation, U.S. courts do not
engage in a meaningful analysis. Instead, they simply pick one side with
little justification, rest on the burden of proof, or make some cursory or
generic statements about the chosen law and then draw a conclusion.
For instance, in IDV North America, Inc. v. Saronno,206 the court
applied the parties’ chosen law, Italian law, to determine the scope of
the forum selection clause. The court noted that it had received
conflicting affidavits from experts in Italian law. The experts
apparently also disagreed on whether domestic Italian law or the

200. Id. at 565; see also Longo v. FlightSafety Int’l, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 63, 69
(E.D.N.Y. 2014).
201. Amto, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 567.
202. No. 16 Civ. 934 (LGS), 2017 WL 1906863 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017).
203. Id. at *5.
204. Id.
205. Cf. Chinese Whispers, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2014)
(synonymous English term) (“Any situation where information is passed on in turn
by a number of people, often becoming distorted in the process.”).
206. No. CV 99058059, 1999 WL 773961, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 1999).
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Brussels Regulation was the appropriate reference point.207 The court
then seemed to break the impasse by invoking the burden of proof,
stating that “the defendant has failed to show that under Italian law, the
language of the forum selection clause confers exclusive jurisdiction on
the Italian court.”208 The court cited two Italian cases in parentheticals and
briefly referenced the Brussels Regulation (without deciding on whether
the Brussels Regulation governed the issue).209 The court did not grapple
with the authorities or actually delve into the relevant language. Instead, it
just seemed to pick one side with little reasoning or justification.210
In LVAR L.P. v. Bermuda Commercial Bank Ltd.,211 the court also halfheartedly applied foreign law to interpret the forum selection clause
at issue.212 In that case, the court said it was applying Bermudan law to
the question of whether the forum selection clause was mandatory or
permissive.213 It cited one Bermudan case in its entire analysis, Re A Trust;
the rest of the citations were to American authorities.214 On the separate
interpretative issue of whether all the parties involved were covered by the
forum selection clause, the court did not even bother citing to Bermudan
law. Instead, it cited exclusively to federal law on point.215
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. For another case where the court rested on the burden of proof, see EIG
Energy Fund XIV, L.P. v. Petroleo Brasileiro S.A., 246 F. Supp. 3d 52, 77–78 (D.D.C.
2017) (“The only evidence of how forum selection clauses operate under Brazilian
law comes from Plaintiffs’ expert, Professor Tucci . . . . The court has no choice but
to accept [the conclusion provided by the Plaintiffs’ expert]. Petrobras bears the
burden of demonstrating that the forum selection clause applies to the parties’
dispute . . . .”), aff’d, 894 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1324
(2019). The conclusion is surprising since the court readily conceded that “the D.C.
Circuit has not yet weighed in on this choice-of-law issue” (i.e., the question of
whether forum or chosen law should govern). Id. at 77; see also Sberbank of Russ. v.
Traisman, No. 3:14cv216 (WWE), 2014 WL 10999674, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 14, 2014)
(“Defendant’s expert Apalikov proffers no persuasive Russian legal authority to
support his proposition that a non-signatory and a non-third party beneficiary to an
agreement retains the ability to enforce the provisions of a non-adhesive commercial
agreement favoring a specific venue.”).
211. No. 13 Civ. 9148 (AT), 2015 WL 1267368 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2015), aff’d, 649
F. App’x 25 (2d Cir. 2016).
212. See id. at *4.
213. Id. at *3.
214. Id. at *3–4. In its analysis, there were citations to seven U.S. cases and the
Restatement of Trusts.
215. Id. at *4; see also Giordano v. UBS, AG, 134 F. Supp. 3d 697, 702–03 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (citing only U.S. cases, even though the court said Swiss law applied).
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Oftentimes, U.S. courts give the appearance of applying foreign
law—by citing broad and non-controversial statements of foreign
law—but then quickly dispose of the interpretation questions without
significant discussion. For instance, in DBS Solutions LLC v. Infovista
Corp.,216 the court referenced French treatises for generic statements
of French law: “[u]nder French law, courts interpreting a contract
attempt to discern the mutual intent of the parties”;217 “a clear and
precise contract must not be ‘denatured’ by resort to one party’s
declaration of intent”;218 and, “French courts favor forum selection clauses
in international commercial agreements.”219 The court then simply drew
the conclusion that the dispute at issue was “related to” the contract under
French law.220 Similarly, in Trade Wind Distribution, LLC v. Unilux Ag,221 the
court referenced non-controversial statements of German law on which the
parties agreed, such as the goal of interpretation being to divine the
“parties’ true ‘intentions.’”222 The court also cited one German case from
1972 and then concluded that German law would regard the forum
selection clause at issue as mandatory.223
These cases illustrate that many courts take the easy way out.224 They like
to say that they are applying the parties’ chosen law to interpret the forum
selection clause, but they really are not. They are including some token
citations to foreign law, perhaps, but they are failing to meaningfully
examine it.

216. No. 3:15-CV-03875-M, 2016 WL 3926505 (N.D. Tex. July 21, 2016).
217. Id. at *3 (citing JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW (2d ed. 2008)).
218. Id. (quoting Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 630 (7th
Cir. 2010)).
219. Id. (citing PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Horatia
Muir Watt & Diego P. Fernández Arroyo eds., 2014)).
220. Id. The sentence where the court apparently explains this conclusion does
not make grammatical sense. See id. (“According to a summary of French law
provided by Defendants, which Plaintiff has not challenged, French courts have
treated broadly language similar to that at issue, including within its terms disputes
which have some connection to the contract.”).
221. No. 10 Civ. 5716 (BMC), 2011 WL 4382986 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2011).
222. Id. at *6.
223. Id. at *7.
224. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 178, at 890–91 (explaining that although judges
maintain a presumption of competency, many U.S. judges refrain from examining
cases involving foreign laws because they do not feel they have sufficient familiarity
or expertise in foreign legal systems or civil law codes).
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Problem Four: Courts tend to engage in macro level analysis
When U.S. courts apply the parties’ chosen law to analyze the scope
of a forum selection clause, they usually do so at a macro level,
without examining the actual issues presented in the case at hand. For
instance, in Martinez v. Bloomberg,225 the Second Circuit was tasked with
determining whether the plaintiff’s statutory discrimination claim fell
within the ambit of the forum selection clause nominating England as the
exclusive forum for the resolution of disputes.226 The court focused on
whether the words “arising hereunder,” contained in a forum selection
clause, would be interpreted narrowly or broadly by an English court.227 It
concluded that English law endorsed a broad approach to the term. The
Martinez court then used this broad approach to conclude that English law
would deem the plaintiff’s discrimination claim to fall within the scope of
the forum selection clause. Accordingly, the Second Circuit enforced the
forum selection clause by dismissing the plaintiff’s action.
The issue in the Martinez case, however, was not whether the words
“arising hereunder” would be interpreted broadly or narrowly under
English law. The issue was whether a claim advanced in a U.S. court—
that the defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)—
was within the ambit of the forum selection clause according to English
law. But, of course, the Second Circuit could not cast the issue in this
light because, thus presented, the question makes no sense. Of course
the ADA claim is not within the purview of the clause. The ADA is a
creature of statute, available only under U.S. law. But the Martinez court
made no effort to ascertain how English law would interpret a forum
selection clause where the claim advanced by the plaintiff in the nonchosen court has no counterpart in the chosen court. If it had, then it
might have referenced the Ryanair Ltd v. Esso Italiana Srl228 case, where
the English court considered the interpretation of a non-exclusive
jurisdiction clause in which the claim involved a violation of “statutory
duty in circumstances where there was no analogous contractual claim
possible under the contract.”229 The court concluded that the Fiona
Trust presumption—that the parties intended all disputes to be
resolved in the chosen forum—was not applicable in these
circumstances. It held that “rational businessmen would be surprised
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

740 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 215–16.
Id. at 224–25.
[2013] EWCA (Civ) 1450, 2 C.L.C. 950.
Id. at [42].
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to be told that a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause bound or entitled
the parties . . . to litigate in a contractually agreed forum an entirely
non-contractual claim for breach of statutory duty . . . .”230 Accordingly, the
English court recognized that statutory claims not having any basis in
the contract may not fall within the ambit of a forum selection clause.
The intention here is not to argue that Martinez was necessarily
incorrectly decided. The intention is simply to illustrate that the
vantage point from which the analysis takes place will necessarily
affect the result. If a U.S. court approaches the inquiry from the
10,000 foot level (does English law interpret “arising hereunder”
broadly or narrowly?), this will yield a different result than if the U.S.
court approached the inquiry at a more granular level (how does
English law determine the scope of a forum selection clause where
there is no legal counterpart in the chosen forum?).
5. Problem Five: Courts unduly rely on one case—at least as it concerns
English law
Many cases involving the intersection between choice of law and
forum selection clauses implicate English law and English courts.231
Accordingly, U.S. courts have had myriad occasions to apply English
law in interpreting the scope of a forum selection clause. Yet, the analysis
is lacking in depth, breadth, and context. As discussed above, U.S. courts
routinely piggyback on other U.S. courts’ views of English law, rather
than going to the source. As such, it seems like one U.S. case sets out
“English law” and the rest follow that case’s lead. In New York, that case
is Martinez v. Bloomberg, which described in detail Fiona Trust, the leading
English case on the interpretation of arbitration clauses.232
230. Id. at [46] (emphasis added).
231. This is not surprising since English courts are renowned worldwide for
commercial law. See THE LAW SOC’Y OF ENG. & WALES, ENGLAND AND WALES: THE
JURISDICTION OF CHOICE 5, https://www.eversheds-sutherland.com/documents/
LawSocietyEnglandAndWalesJurisdictionOfChoice.pdf [https://perma.cc/JGB7-RX4W]
(“Our courts, particularly those in London, play host to many parties from overseas:
at the specialised Commercial Court, a staggering 80% of cases involve a foreign
claimant or defendant. Of course, that has a knock-on effect and the success of the
legal services sector plays an unquantifiable role in helping London to maintain its
position as a major centre for global commerce . . . . In ever more complex,
sophisticated and inter-related markets, English commercial law provides
predictability of outcome, legal certainty and fairness.”).
232. The Second Circuit described English law as follows:
The House of Lords . . . indicated that interpretation of arbitration
clauses should start from the assumption that “there is no rational basis upon
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The Martinez court noted that the Fiona Trust case stands for the
proposition that courts should broadly construe arbitration clauses.233
Thus, a presumption arises that parties intended all disputes to fall
within the ambit of an arbitration clause, including disputes related to
the validity of the clause. The Martinez case took the Fiona Trust
principle and applied it to a case involving the interpretation of a
forum selection clause in an employment agreement.234 While the
court acknowledged the differences between the Fiona Trust case and
the dispute at issue in Martinez, it nonetheless concluded that English
courts would treat the two cases similarly. Cases after Martinez seized on its
premise that the Fiona Trust case is, essentially, the be-all-and-end-all when
it comes to interpreting forum selection clauses under English law.235
There are some problems, however, with U.S. courts’ exclusive
reliance on the Fiona Trust case to guide them in interpreting forum
selection clauses under English law. First, Fiona Trust involved the
interpretation of an arbitration agreement, not a forum selection
clause.236 It specifically involved whether an arbitrator should, in the
first instance, decide issues related to the validity of an arbitration
agreement.237 The English court concluded that the parties likely
intended for all issues, including those of the validity of the arbitration

which businessmen would be . . . likely to wish to have questions of the
validity or enforceability of the contract decided by one tribunal and
questions about its performance decided by another.” Consequently, it held
that courts should presume that an arbitration clause encompasses all
disputes involving the relationship into which the contracting parties entered
“unless the language makes it clear that certain questions were intended to
be excluded from the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.”
Although the Fiona Trust case involved an arbitration clause, the decision
refers broadly to the interpretation of “jurisdiction clauses.” English courts
have repeatedly applied the holding in the Fiona Trust case to cases involving
forum selection clauses.
Martinez, 740 F.3d at 224–25 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 225.
235. See Amto, LLC v. Bedford Asset Mgmt., LLC, 168 F. Supp. 3d 556, 565–66
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Martinez and the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the
Fiona Trust extensively); Longo v. FlightSafety Int’l, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 63, 69
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Martinez for the principle that the Fiona Trust “is the
controlling English decision on the subject”).
236. Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov [2007] UKHL 40, [2] (appeal taken
from Eng.).
237. Id. at [4].
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clause itself, to be decided by an arbitrator.238 Thus, the case involved the
interpretation of an arbitration clause as it concerned the proper
division of adjudicative authority (court vs. arbitrator).239
U.S. courts have taken the Fiona Trust decision to mean something
different: that when the parties agree to adjudicate “all disputes” in a
particular forum, that phrase should be read broadly to include statutory,
tort, and extra-contractual claims. This is not the proposition that Fiona
Trust stands for.240 The Fiona Trust case simply stands for the proposition
that issues related to the validity of the arbitration agreement should be
adjudicated by the arbitrator designated by the parties.241 Ironically, U.S.
courts deem issues of validity to be procedural matters determined by the
law of the forum, a holding directly at odds with the Fiona Trust principle.
Thus, U.S. courts are using the Fiona Trust authority selectively and in a way
that differs considerably from the case holding itself.
Second, the Fiona Trust case involved an international commercial
dispute. Accordingly, the court observed that “rational businessmen”
would not intend to have disputes bifurcated between the courts and an
arbitrator.242 As such, it must be presumed that they intended one-stopshopping, i.e., for an arbitrator to decide all disputes. This rationale does
not instinctively apply beyond the international commercial context. In
particular, this rationale does not carry much weight in the consumer
context, where a weaker party is beholden to terms imposed on it by the
stronger party.
Third, a closer look reveals that English courts have imposed limits on
the Fiona Trust principle. For instance, in Deutsche Bank AG London Branch

238. Id. at [13], [19].
239. See id.
240. Its language can be extrapolated to that different proposition—but it is a
different proposition nonetheless.
241. The Martinez court concluded:
Although the Fiona Trust case involved an arbitration clause, the decision
refers broadly to the interpretation of “jurisdiction clauses.” English courts
have repeatedly applied the holding in the Fiona Trust case to cases involving
forum selection clauses. In UBS AG v. HSH Nordbank AG, the Court of Appeal
found that “[t]he proper approach to the construction of clauses agreeing
jurisdiction is to construe them widely and generously,” and that “in the
usual case the words ‘arising out of’ or ‘in connection with’ apply to claims
arising from pre-inception matters such as misrepresentation.”
Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted)). What
the Martinez court is missing is that the Fiona Trust case was simply deciding that issues of
validity are to be determined by the court designated in the forum selection clause.
242. [2007] UKHL 40 at [13].
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v. Petromena ASA,243 the court stated that “Since Fiona Trust . . . it is
axiomatic as a matter of English law, that jurisdiction clauses and
arbitration clauses should be widely and generously construed, but this
does not extend to all relationships however different even if they are
assumed by the parties to an original relationship.”244 In Airbus SAS v.
Generali Italia SpA,245 the court quoted with approval Dicey and Morris’s
treatise, stating that “the decision in Fiona Trust has limited application to
the questions which arise where parties are bound by several contracts
which contain jurisdiction agreements for different countries.”246
Moreover, English courts have repeatedly held that normal canons of
contractual constructions are to be applied in determining the scope of a
jurisdiction clause, irrespective of the presumption in the Fiona Trust.247
Thus, under English law, the scope of a forum selection clause does not
rise or fall exclusively on one case, as the U.S. case law would suggest.
As this Section illustrates, U.S. courts are not particularly interested in,
or adept at, applying foreign law to interpret a forum selection clause. The
exercise is complicated, convoluted, and unnecessary. In the long-run,
litigants will fare better by having a court apply a body of law it is familiar
with to resolve interpretation issues presented by forum selection clauses.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that courts should not apply the parties’
chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause. The rationales
provided in support of applying the parties’ chosen law are not

243. [2015] EWCA (Civ) 226.
244. Id. at [84] (citations omitted).
245. [2019] EWCA (Civ) 805.
246. Id. at [60]; see also Tr. Risk Grp. SpA v. AmTrust Eur Ltd. [2015] EWCA (Civ)
437 [46] (quoting the same treatise; Dreymoor Fertilisers Overseas PTE Ltd. v.
Eurochem Trading GmbH [2018] EWHC (Comm) 909 [37] (same quote)).
247. See BN Rendering Ltd. v. Everwarm Ltd. [2018] CSOH 45 [6] (Scot.); see also
Shearman & Sterling LLP, Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc v. China Haisheng
Juice Holdings Co. Ltd: Banking-ISDA Master Agreement, 25 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG.
N23, N23–25 (2010) (“The conclusion reached by Teare J. was that the construction
of the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Master Agreement must depend upon its
own terms. In construing the clause he accepted that he should be guided by the
approach of Lord Collins in UBS AG v HSH Nordbank AG and by the approach of
Lord Hoffman in Fiona Trust to the construction of arbitration clauses, but the key
question was whether cl.13 could reasonably be understood to mean that MSIP and
CH promised each other that claims arising out or in connection with the Master
Agreement would be brought in England regardless of whether the claims were
against the other or a non-party to the Master Agreement.”).
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sufficiently compelling to counterbalance the complexity of such an
exercise. Accordingly, U.S. courts should apply forum law to all
preliminary questions involving forum selection clauses—validity,
enforceability, and interpretation. This is the easiest and cleanest
solution to the choice of law/choice of forum conundrum.
Any perceived unfairness in this approach can easily be mitigated by
the parties themselves. If parties clearly draft forum selection clauses,
there is very little, if anything, that requires interpretation. Professor
Coyle notes that “[i]f a contract is clearly drafted, of course, there will be
no need for the courts to invoke any of the canons discussed above.
Contract drafters should therefore aspire to state their intentions clearly,
thereby making it unnecessary for the courts to construe a clause.”248
Professor Coyle then provides a guide to how litigants can draft
appropriate forum selection clauses that achieve a desired result.249 With
respect to the two most common interpretation issues that arise—whether
the clause is mandatory or permissive and whether the clause
encompasses the dispute at issue—he offers the following guidance:
If the goal is EXCLUSIVITY, use words like “sole,” “only,”
“exclusive,” and “must” to convey an intent to litigate exclusively in
the chosen forum.
If the goal is NON-EXCLUSIVITY, omit all the words listed above
and use the word “non-exclusive” or state that the parties “submit
to jurisdiction” or “consent to venue” in the chosen forum.
If the goal is to give the clause a BROAD SCOPE, state that the
clause shall apply to all claims “relating to” the contract or the
parties’ relationship.
If the goal is to give the clause a NARROW SCOPE, state that the
clause shall only apply to “contract claims” or to claims “arising out
of the alleged breach of this agreement.”250

Ultimately, since the parties themselves are able to effectively convey what
they intend in a forum selection clause simply by taking some time to
carefully draft it, the forum selection clause meets choice of law clause issue
is rendered moot. But if parties fail to draft their forum selection clauses
carefully, courts should not engage in “conflict-of-laws contortions”251 to
honor the parties’ so-called intent by applying their chosen law to
questions of forum selection clause interpretation.

248.
249.
250.
251.

Coyle, supra note 2, at 1851.
Id. tbl.1.
Id.
Mullenix, supra note 5, at 347.

